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Article

Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for
Lemons?
Darian M. Ibrahim†
INTRODUCTION
Everything is online now—the way we connect with others,
the way we shop, even some forms of education. We keep up
with friends on Facebook we cannot see in person, buy light
bulbs from Amazon rather than making a trip to the hardware
store,1 and obtain an MBA at night on our computers from the
comfort of our own home after the kids have gone to bed.2 One
area that has initially resisted the move to cyberspace, however—eschewing the virtual world for the real one—is entrepreneurial finance.
Venture capitalists (VCs) and angel investors have long
valued close networks and personal relationships when selecting which entrepreneurs to fund, and they closely monitor their
investments in person after they fund.3 These practices lead to
intense locality in funding—i.e., investors funding entrepre† Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. My thanks to Brian
Broughman, Joan Heminway, Don Langevoort, Alan Meese, Nate Oman, Jason Parsont, Gordon Smith, participants in a faculty workshop at Washington
& Lee for helpful feedback on this Article. Special thanks to research assistants Lauren Bridenbaugh, David Nangle, and Brian Reagan and law librarians Fred Dingledy and Cheryl O‘Connor for their excellent research support.
Copyright © 2015 by Darian M. Ibrahim.
1. See Trefis Team, Amazon Crumbles Brick and Mortar Stores, Stock
Primed for Move to $233, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2011, 1:49 PM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/12/09/amazon-crumbles-brick-and-mortar
-stores-stock-primed-for-move-to-233.
2. See AUBURN UNIVERSITY MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
ONLINE,
http://harbert.auburn.edu/academics/online-programs/mba-online
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015); THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL JD LAW COURSES ONLINE, http://www.jmls.edu/academics/jd/jd-online.php (last visited Nov.
2, 2015); KELLEY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ONLINE MBA, http://kelley.iu.edu/
onlineMBA/Online/MBA/page36790.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); OPEN YALE
COURSES, http://oyc.yale.edu (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
3. See infra Part II.
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neurs in their own communities. But with everything else in
society moving online, why not entrepreneurial finance? Can
online platforms successfully match entrepreneurs and investors from different communities? Why does a Midwestern entrepreneur need to convince investors in Chicago to fund her
startup when there are substantially more investors across the
nation who may be interested? And on the flip side, the Internet democratizes investing by allowing the majority of those
without connections to angels or VCs the possibility of getting
rich funding the next Facebook or Twitter.4
Public opinion—and now the law—is highly supportive of
the online ―crowdfunding‖ trend. In an age where bipartisan
support for anything in Congress is uncommon, allowing entrepreneurs to use the Internet to raise money is a rarity: everyone seems to like it.5 The Jumpstart Our Businesses Startups
(JOBS) Act6 passed with bipartisan support.7 The JOBS Act allows general solicitation of accredited investors, a move that
makes online matchmaking and investing legally possible in a
way that it was not before.8 The Capital Raising Online While
Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosures (CROWDFUND) Act—part of the JOBS Act—goes even further and allows even unaccredited investors to invest in startups without
the safeguards that have always been provided to unaccredited
investors under the securities laws.9 Crowdfunding is thought
4. See Jean Eaglesham, Crowdfunding Efforts Draw Suspicion, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 18, 2013, at C1 (quoting President Obama as calling crowdfunding
a ―game changer‖ that allows ―ordinary Americans . . . to go online and invest
in entrepreneurs they believe in‖).
5. See Tanya Prive, Inside the JOBS Act: Equity Crowdfunding, FORBES
(Nov. 6, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/
11/06/inside-the-jobs-act-equity-crowdfunding-2 (―The issue is entrepreneurs
find it very difficult to access financing. . . . These portals could serve as a
great vehicle for investing in small businesses, which are accountable for creating 65% of the net new jobs over the past 17 years.‖).
6. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301–
305, 126 Stat. 307, 315–323 (2012) (codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77r, 78a–78o
(2012)).
7. See Leigh Ann Caldwell, Obama Signs “JOBS Act” into Law, Calls It a
“Game-Changer,” CBS NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/obama-signs-jobs-act-into-law-calls-it-a-game-changer (―The bill passed
Congress with bipartisan support. Republican lawmakers, including House
Majority Leader Eric Cantor, stood directly behind the president during the
signing ceremony. ‗By increasing access to capital and reducing onerous regulations, entrepreneurs and small business owners will have more ability to
take risks, grow and create jobs,‘ Cantor said in a statement.‖).
8. See infra Part I.B.1.
9. See infra Part I.B.2.
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to fill a funding gap for startups that cannot attract other financing, or are too early in their life cycles to attract angels
and VCs.10
This Article examines the progression in entrepreneurial
finance from: (1) traditional angel/VC operations through personal networks; to (2) online soliciting of accredited investors
(JOBS Act Title II); to (3) full-blown crowdfunding to anyone
who wishes to invest in a startup (JOBS Act Title III).11 This
Article‟s first main contribution is to show that Title II sites are
succeeding, and to explain why. Its second main contribution is
to theorize about how Title III might play out when implemented, and to suggest legal reforms to increase its chances for success.
The Article begins by defining ―crowdfunding‖ and distinguishing its two main types. Crowdfunding can be equity-based,
meaning investors receive stock in a business in exchange for
their money, or it can be non-equity based, when people either
donate funds or obtain rewards in exchange for their contributions.12 From a legal perspective, equity crowdfunding is the far
more interesting of the two types and is the type of crowdfunding that this Article focuses on.13
10. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 101 (2012) (noting the ―unavailability of
traditional sources of small business financing‖ for new startups); Thomas G.
James, Far from the Maddening Crowd: Does the JOBS Act Provide Meaningful Redress to Small Investors for Securities Fraud in Connection with Crowdfunding Offerings?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1767, 1787 (2013) (―[C]rowdfunding fills a
necessary funding gap for startups seeking needed capital . . . .‖). But see Jill
E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2
J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 63 (1998) (―The inability of small businesses
to find adequate capital may not indicate a market failure, however. The high
failure rate of small businesses demonstrates the risky nature of small business investment . . . .‖).
11. In my estimation, which is consistent with the nomenclature in the
JOBS Act, Title II is a step toward crowdfunding but is not actually crowdfunding. Title III, on the other hand, is crowdfunding and is the more controversial and problematic of the JOBS Act changes. See Kendall Almerico, Want
To Make Equity Crowdfunding Legal? 3 Experts Sound Off, ENTREPRENEUR
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/237000 (contending that
as of late 2014, without Title III‘s implementation, ―equity crowdfunding‖ has
not yet been made legal).
12. Alan R. Palmiter, Pricing Disclosure: Crowdfunding‟s Curious Conundrum, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 373, 375 (2012) (noting that
crowdfunding originated in the U.S. on the non-equity side); Chance Barnett,
Crowdfunding Sites in 2014, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:11 PM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2014/08/29/crowdfunding-sites-in-2014.
13. There are other ways to break down and define the various types of
crowdfunding. Bradford, supra note 10, at 14–27 (offering a fuller taxonomy of
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With some understanding of our eventual target—equity
crowdfunding—in mind, the Article then peers back to the time
before online investing took hold. Expert angels and VCs operating in tight geographic networks, most notably Silicon Valley,
have funded and advised Apple, Google, Facebook, Twitter,
Tesla Motors and virtually every other software, social media,
and biotech company you can think of. What explains this success? One answer is that intense geographic locality in traditional entrepreneurial finance mitigates investor risk both preand post-investment. It follows, then, that a major concern with
crowdfunding is that the very thing touted about it—the democratization of investing through the Internet—eliminates the
tight knit communities that have made entrepreneurial finance
successful to date.
Despite this foundational concern, entrepreneurial finance‘s move to cyberspace is inevitable. As startups need less
money to ramp up,14 and because it is cheaper and more efficient to raise money online than in person,15 startups will likely
raise an increasingly large percentage of funds over the Internet. This Article asks the normative question of whether this
trend toward online fundraising is desirable, completing our
progression from traditional investing to online investing by
examining Titles II and III of the JOBS Act in turn. Do these
laws adequately balance the SEC‘s twin goals of raising capital
and investor protection, or do they skew too heavily toward the
former?16 More pointedly, will Title III crowdfunding—the end
goal of the legislation—turn into a market for ―lemons,‖17 existing only for low-quality startups and foolish investors?
the various strains of crowdfunding). For my purposes, because equity crowdfunding invokes the securities laws while other types do not, the non-equity
types of crowdfunding are lumped together and not analyzed further. See
Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned
on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2012) (―Unlike raising
money for charities or other nonprofit ventures, a business seeking investors
through crowdfunding implicates the securities laws . . . .‖).
14. See infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.
15. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1457, 1471 (2013) (discussing the low promotion costs of online offerings).
16. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 1767 (―Exposing unsophisticated investors to risky investments without adequate disclosure unduly sacrifices investor-protection goals to the perceived need to lower the disclosure barriers for
small businesses and crowdfunding techniques.‖).
17. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing
how the market for ―lemons‖ problem intersects with quality differences and
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Before reaching the more difficult question posed by Title
III, I reveal that the less-radical Title II,18 which allows general
solicitation of accredited investors, seems to have proven successful for entrepreneurs and investors in its first year of operation. Online platforms such as AngelList, FundersClub, and
CircleUp have successfully matched entrepreneurs and accredited investors and raised significant cash for startups. This is
somewhat surprising, at least in the first analysis, considering:
(1) that moving operations online would appear to weaken the
close networks and geographic locality that explain traditional
angel/VC success; and (2) that the first Internet matching service for startups and accredited investors, ACE-Net, failed miserably over a decade ago.19
I contend that, upon closer examination, Title II‘s success
should not come as a surprise after all. The Title II sites that
have been successful more closely resemble traditional angel
investing rather than some new paradigm of entrepreneurial
finance. AngelList, FundersClub, and Circle Up operate like
traditional angels, they just do so online instead of in person.
Title II platforms are simply taking advantage of the Internet to
reduce the transaction costs of traditional angel and VC operations and add passive angels to their networks at a low cost. The
key network players on Title II platforms are the same angels
and VCs who invest offline, and the ―new‖ accredited investors
being solicited are piggybacking on a select group‘s expertise. I
show that ACE-Net failed because, even though it was limited
to accredited investors, it more closely resembled a new network without strong intermediaries and established players
than the current Title II platforms. Conversely, Title II is succeeding because it is only a modest change in current practice.
The analysis changes when we reach Title III, however. Title III allows unaccredited investors to invest through online
uncertainty).
18. This is not to say that Title II is without its concerns. See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law‟s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3422–
25 (2013) (highlighting concerns with equating wealth and sophistication under the accredited investors rule); Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital
Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1578 (2013) (expressing concerns about
allowing general solicitation of accredited investors when their sophistication
is in doubt given the ease of satisfying the accredited investor criteria). Despite concerns, Title II has gotten far less attention and criticism than Title
III.
19. See infra notes 105–13 and accompanying text for a discussion of
ACE-Net.
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platforms without the traditional protections of the securities
laws. While Title III is still in a holding pattern waiting for
SEC rules to implement it,20 Title III represents a true equity
crowdfunding situation and a paradigm shift in entrepreneurial
finance. Title III crowdfunding is significantly different than
Title II for three reasons: (1) Title III is more than moving existing networks online; unaccredited investors are not part of
existing angel/VC networks, and thus their inclusion would
form new networks of players unknown to each other; (2) given
the sheer numbers of unaccredited vs. accredited investors, this
would more closely resemble a non-expert based, ―wisdom of
the crowds‖ situation than piggybacking on expert investors;
and (3) given the foregoing, the identity and quality of the entrepreneurs, investors, and matchmaking sites under Title III
might be different. Due to Title III‘s extreme departure from
traditional entrepreneurial finance, there is a significant risk
that it will fail as ACE-Net did.
I argue that any such projections about Title III require
more careful analysis. First, there are reasons to believe some
high-quality entrepreneurs and investors will use Title III once
it is implemented. Namely, some startups will be too earlystage to seek financing from traditional angels or under Title
II, and they might prefer Title III over bootstrapping or
―friends and family‖ money. Another subset of high-quality
startups might choose to unbundle the traditional investor‘s
cash and value-added services (e.g., advice connections) and
seek only cash under Title III without paying a premium for
value-added services. Second, there is the related question of
whether those high-quality Title III startups will be outnumbered by low-quality startups with no good way for unaccredited investors to distinguish between them. Should that happen,
high-quality startups would not be valued appropriately, resulting in their exit from Title III, leaving only ―lemons‖ remaining.21 I argue that the wisdom of crowds and strong intermediation are two potential ways to solve the lemons problem
under Title III.
20. Press Release, Congressman Jared Polis, Polis Issa Lead 26 Members
of Congress in Letter Urging SEC to Implement Crowdfunding Rules (Aug. 12
2014), http://polis.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=390763
(―[A] bipartisan group of twenty-six colleagues, today sent a letter to Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair Mary Jo White urging her to complete
the ‗crowdfunding‘ rulemaking process . . . .‖).
21. See infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
―lemons‖ problem.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I defines crowdfunding and discusses changes in the JOBS Act that make it legally
possible. Part II peers back to the time before online investing
to discuss why traditional angel and VC financing has been so
successful. Part III uses the analytical framework developed in
the previous Part to analyze Title II of the JOBS Act, which allows for general solicitation of accredited investors over the Internet. I conclude that, while puzzling on the surface, Title II is
proving successful with good reason—Title II sites are really
just existing angel and VC networks moved online to reduce the
transaction costs of operation and add passive angels at a low
cost. Part IV then analyzes Title III of the JOBS Act, the more
radical crowdfunding provisions. I suggest that Title III
might—but doesn‘t need to—turn into a market for lemons. I
conclude by offering changes to Title III that could help avoid
the lemons problem.
I. CROWDFUNDING DEFINED AND MADE LEGAL
―Crowdfunding‖ may be commonly thought of as using the
Internet to raise money for a product or cause. Businesses, political campaigns, and charitable organizations all use the Internet to raise money. Crowdfunding adds a financing element
to its precursor, ―crowdsourcing.‖22 Wikipedia and Yelp! are
both crowdsourced projects.23 For both crowdsourcing and now
crowdfunding, the ―crowd‖ part of the word implies using the
wisdom of crowds as opposed to reliance on experts.24 This bottom-up approach brings to mind prediction markets such as the
Iowa prediction market.25 President Barack Obama successful22. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1459 (―[C]rowdfunding has its origins
in ‗crowdsourcing,‘ which is ‗a type of participative online activity in which an
individual, an institution, a non-profit organization, or company proposes to a
group of individuals . . . via a flexible open call, the voluntary undertaking of a
task.‘‖ (quoting Enrique Estellés-Arolas & Fernando Gonzáles-Ladrón-deGuevara, Towards an Integrated Crowdsourcing Definition, 38 J. INFO. SCI.
189, 197 (2012))). Another precursor is microlending (or microfinance). Bradford, supra note 10, at 28.
23. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1459.
24. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY
ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMICS, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 5–22 (2004) (discussing different
ways of utilizing collective wisdom).
25. See Iowa Electronic Markets, UNIV. OF IOWA COLL. OF BUS., http://
tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/markets (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); see also Michael
Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1346–49 (2007) (applying the idea of prediction markets to corporate governance).
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ly used the Internet to raise record sums for his 2008 campaign, an early example of a successful crowdfunding campaign.26
For purposes of this Article, I differentiate two main types
of crowdfunding: non-equity based and equity-based. This Part
will explore those two crowdfunding variations in turn, explain
why equity crowdfunding is far more interesting from a legal
perspective, and detail changes in the JOBS Act that have
made equity crowdfunding legal.
A. NON-EQUITY VS. EQUITY CROWDFUNDING
Non-equity crowdfunding is when people donate money
online or purchase products or experiences in exchange for contributions to a project.27 For example, ―The Veronica Mars Movie Project‖ provided different prizes based on the amount of
money a person donated, including t-shirts, a personalized video greeting from a cast member, tickets to the movie premiere,
or being an extra in the movie.28 Importantly, none of the backers of a rewards crowdfunding project receive an interest (such
as a share of the profits) in the project‘s later success.29
Kickstarter and Indiegogo are two of the most popular nonequity crowdfunding platforms. Kickstarter, the platform for
the Veronica Mars movie, follows an ―all-or-nothing‖ funding
approach, meaning that a project only gets funded if it raises
all of the funds sought.30 Kickstarter is emphatic that it does
26. See Michael Luo, Small Online Contributions Add Up to Huge Fundraising Edge for Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/02/20/us/politics/20obama.html (ironically describing Obama‘s campaign
headquarters as having ―the feel of an Internet start-up‖).
27. See Barnett, supra note 12.
28. The Veronica Mars Movie Project, KICKSTARTER, http://www
.kickstarter.com/projects/559914737/the-veronica-mars-movie-project/posts/
427900 (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
29. Barnett, supra note 12. Despite the lack of a profit‘s share in the movie‘s eventual success, the Veronica Mars project raised its $2 million goal in
just 11 hours. Erin Strecker, “Veronica Mars” Movie Is a Go, ENT. WKLY. (Mar.
13, 2013, 8:55 PM), http://www.ew.com/article/2013/03/13/veronica-mars
-movie-is-a-go-kickstarter. The project ultimately raised over $5.7 million and
became the fifth highest grossing rewards crowdfunding project. Matthew
Toren, 10 Crowdfunding Success Stories To Love, ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 18,
2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/232234.
30. Kickstarter‘s success rate is just under 40%, with a majority of projects receiving less than 20% of their funding goal. Stats, KICKSTARTER http://
www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=footer (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Through
Kickstarter, 95,092 projects totaling $2.05 billion have been successfully funded. See id.
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not engage in equity crowdfunding,31 nor does it allow charitable campaigns.32 Indiegogo is different in a couple of important
respects. First, it allows projects to raise less than the full
amount sought.33 Second, Indiegogo encourages charitable
campaigning and offers a 25% discount to registered 501(c)(3)
nonprofits.34
Equity crowdfunding is different than non-equity crowdfunding in a key way. In equity crowdfunding, investors contribute money in exchange for a tangible interest in the venture
they are funding, most often stock.35 Unlike traditional entrepreneurial finance, where startups may be screened in person
at a monthly meeting of angels, equity crowdfunding uses a virtual platform to match investors and entrepreneurs. Because
investors receive equity in exchange for their funds, they are
purchasing ―securities,‖ and thus the securities laws regulate
the transaction.36
B. LEGAL CHANGES IN THE JOBS ACT THAT FACILITATE EQUITY
CROWDFUNDING
Harnessing the power of the Internet to raise capital for
small businesses drove the bi-partisan support and easy pas31. Our Rules, KICKSTARTER, http:// www.kickstarter.com/rules (last visited Nov. 2, 2015); Seven Things To Know About Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER,
http://www.kickstarter.com/hello (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (―Creators keep
100% ownership of their work. Backers are supporting projects to help them
come to life, not to profit financially.‖).
32. Our Rules, supra note 31.
33. INDIEGOGO, http://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us (last visited Nov. 2,
2015). Indiegogo allows either ―Flexible‖ or ―Fixed‖ Funding. Under the ―Fixed
Funding‖ model, project creators must raise the full amount sought to keep
any of the funds, like Kickstarter. Under the ―Flexible Funding‖ model, project
creators can raise and keep less than the full amount sought. See How Much
Does Indiegogo Cost? Fees & Pricing, INDIEGOGO, https://support.indiegogo
.com/hc/en-us/articles/204456408-Fees-Pricing (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
34. Id.
35. Equity crowdfunding is the focus of this Article, although ―debt crowdfunding‖ may not be far behind. See Amy Cortese, The Crowdfunding Crowd
Is Anxious, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/
06/business/crowdfunding-for-small-business-is-still-an-unclear-path.html
(―Much of the crowdfunding focus has been on equity—selling shares in startups—but SoMoLend is betting that loans to expanding small businesses are a
bigger opportunity. Equity crowdfunding will be ‗minuscule compared to the
impact crowdfunding will have on debt financing,‘ says Candace Klein, SoMoLend‘s founder and C.E.O. ‗We think this is literally going to change the banking system.‘‖). Debt financing is not to be confused with microlending, which
does not implicate the securities laws.
36. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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sage of the JOBS Act.37 Prior to the JOBS Act, the securities
laws contained two main roadblocks to equity crowdfunding:
the ban on general solicitation in Rule 506 private offerings and
the strict rules for selling to unaccredited investors in such offerings.
1. Title II: Allowing General Solicitation of Accredited
Investors
First, while Regulation D38 and Rule 50639 promulgated
under the Securities Act of 1933 allow startups to raise money
in private offerings without SEC registration, they do not allow
startups to seek potential investors through ―general solicitation or general advertising.‖40 ―To avoid making a general solicitation, [an entrepreneur] must have a preexisting, substantive
relationship with the potential investor.‖41
It is easy to see how the general solicitation ban would present a problem when the Internet is involved. How can an entrepreneur have a preexisting relationship with every angel or
VC who might view his information online? The short answer is
that he cannot. As a 2006 report on Rule 506 and general solicitation noted, the ban on general solicitation ―prohibits issuers
from taking advantage of the tremendous efficiencies and reach
of the Internet to communicate with potential investors.‖42
Title II of the JOBS Act solves the general solicitation
problem, which has long been seen as a hindrance to small

37. The initial form of the JOBS Act bill was passed by the House of Representatives after only one day of consideration. 158 CONG. REC. H1275 (daily
ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (indicating H.R. 3606 was passed 390-23 on March 8, with
consideration beginning on March 7).
38. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506 (2014).
39. Id. § 230.506; see also Abraham J. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why
Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
107, 132 (2010) (―The exemption from registration that most startup companies rely on is Rule 506 of Regulation D . . . .‖).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
41. Darian M. Ibrahim, Financing the Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 717, 756 (2010); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet:
The Elusive Promise of “Technological Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 6 (1998) (commenting
on general solicitation that ―there has consistently been a dominant message:
the ‗pre-existing relationship‘ test is the key‖).
42. ADVISORY COMM. ON SMALLER PUB. COS., FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 75 (Apr. 23, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/
info/smallbus/ascpc/acspc-finalreport.pdf.
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businesses raising capital.43 Title II removes the ban on general
solicitation in 506 offerings provided only accredited investors
are solicited, and that there are ―reasonable steps to verify‖ the
accredited status of the investors.44 By removing Rule 506‘s ban
on general solicitation, online investing in limited form (due to
the accredited investor restriction) became possible.45
2. Title III: Easing Sales to Unaccredited Investors
To obtain a true equity crowdfunding situation, the majority of us unaccredited investors must be allowed to participate
in startup offerings. The Internet can be a powerful tool to use
the wisdom of crowds to identify and fund the next big idea, but
a true crowd-based approach requires opening up the process to
more than accredited investors. Currently most Rule 506 offerings, and virtually all startups‘ sales to angels and VCs, are
limited to accredited investors due to the disclosure and other
requirements involved when bringing unaccredited investors
into the mix.46 While accredited investors are thought to be
43. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It‟s Time To Allow General Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1 (2004); JD Alois, CircleUp: 40 Companies and $40 Million Funded,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/
2014/09/50858-circleup-40-companies-40-million (noting that Title II of the
JOBS Act allowance of general solicitation ―was an incredibly important
change that finally allowed online investment crowdfunding portals to truly
come to life‖).
44. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a),
126 Stat. 306, 309 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d) (instructing the SEC to
remove the ―prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising‖
under Rule 506). Another change is enhancing the issuer‘s belief that an investor is accredited, which the issuer must now take ―reasonable steps to verify.‖ Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 77 Fed. Reg. 55,464, 54,467
(Sept. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239) (―[R]easonable steps
. . . . [is] an objective determination, based on the particular facts and circumstances of each transaction. . . . [F]actors include: [1.] the nature of the purchaser and the type of accredited investor that the purchaser claims to be; [2.]
the amount and type of information that the issuer has about the purchaser;
and [3.] the nature of the offering, such as the manner in which the purchaser
was solicited to participate in the offering, and the terms of the offering, such
as a minimum investment amount.‖ (bullet points omitted)).
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2014).
46. Even before the JOBS Act, startups did not have to make disclosures
to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2014); Interpretative Release on Regulation D, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,045, 10,045 (Mar. 10, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 231) (―[I]f accredited investors are the only purchasers in
offerings under Rules 505 and 506, Regulation D does not require delivery of
specific disclosure . . . .‖); see also Rodrigues, supra note 18, at 3394 (―U.S. securities law has always allowed wealthy investors to enter certain markets
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able to fend for themselves, unaccredited investors are not, and
that is the basis for their differing legal treatment.47
Title III of the JOBS Act would make it possible, for the
first time, for unaccredited investors to purchase equity in nascent startups through the Internet. Title III directs the SEC to
promulgate rules to implement this broad and significant
change, although no rules have yet been made.48 Title III permits limited deregulated offerings by reducing the issuer disclosures that Rule 506 has long required.49 This sweeping
change in unaccredited investor protection has led to fears that
unaccredited investors will supply ―dumb money‖ into lowquality or fraudulent startups.50 Such fears explain the holdup
in the SEC passing rules to implement Title III.51
Title III attempts to limit the downside for unaccredited
investors in a novel way—by specifying how much they can
purchase in Title III startups in any given year. For investors
with annual incomes below $100,000, that cap is $2000 or 5% of
their income, whichever is greater.52 Investors with annual incomes over $100,000 can invest the greater of $10,000 or 10% of
their income.53 While the final result on Title III is unclear at
the current time, and provisions may be subject to change,54 al(including not only the market for private company investments . . . while cordoning off average (retail) investors from the same opportunities.‖).
47. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124–25 (1953); Rodrigues,
supra note 18, at 3417–22 (tracing the history of the accredited investor exemption in private placements).
48. Palmiter, supra note 12, at 394 n.78 (―The SEC has been charged with
drafting regulations to enact the crowdfunding provisions . . . .‖). Just before
the publication of this Article, the SEC released final rules to permit crowdfunding, however these rules had not yet been published in the Federal Register. See SEC, Crowdfunding Final Rule (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec
.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf.
49. See infra notes 163–65 and accompanying text.
50. Hazen, supra note 13, at 1766 (―[T]he solicitation of small investors is
likely to attract unsophisticated investors who are in need of the investor protection provisions generally found in the securities laws.‖).
51. There is a risk of fraud in Title III, especially considering that ―[t]he
JOBS Act exemptions bear some resemblance to the old Rule 504, which allowed ‗non-reporting issuers to offer and sell securities to an unlimited number of persons without regard to their sophistication or experience and without
delivery of any specified information.‘ The old Rule 504 enabled widespread
fraud . . . .‖ Sherief Morsy, Note, The JOBS Act and Crowdfunding: How Narrowing the Secondary Market Handicaps Fraud Plaintiffs, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
1373, 1380 (2014).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012).
53. Id.
54. See Equity Crowdfunding Improvement Act of 2014, H.R. 4564, 113th
Cong. (2014), http://www.opencongress.org/bill/hr4564-113/text (last visited
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lowing unaccredited investors to participate in a meaningful
way in online investing is a necessary step to achieving true
equity crowdfunding.
II. TRADITIONAL ANGEL AND VC INVESTING
Having described equity crowdfunding and the legal
changes under the JOBS Act that are making it possible, this
Article now shifts its focus to the normative question of whether equity crowdfunding is desirable. The analytical framework
used to evaluate this normative question is that of traditional
entrepreneurial finance. Why is startup investing so difficult,
and what made angels and VCs so successful before online platforms came into existence?
Part A discusses the significant risks involved in funding
early-stage startups. Without being able to manage these risks,
rational investors would not fund these businesses. Part B explains how VCs have managed these risks through the use of
detailed investment contracts. Part C explains how, in contrast,
angel investors use informal means to manage the same risks.
A. THE TRIO OF RISKS IN FUNDING STARTUPS
As Ronald Gilson was the first to explain, early-stage
startups present extreme levels of uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency costs.55 Startups present uncertainty
both because they are new, and thus have no track records, and
because they are often high-tech, which adds the element of
technological uncertainty.56 There is information asymmetry,
meaning the entrepreneur knows more than his investors,
again due to the lack of a track record and perhaps a new technology.57 While uncertainty and information asymmetry are ex
ante (or pre-) investment problems, agency costs present themselves ex post (or post-) investment. Agency costs are the fear
that post-investment, the entrepreneur will act (with the investors‘ money) in a way that benefits himself and not the inves-

Nov. 2, 2015); see also Samuel Guzik, JOBS Act 2.0: Congressman McHenry‟s
Cure for the “Six Deadly Sins” of Crowdfunding Regulation, CROWDFUNDING
INSIDER (May 5, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/05/
37673-jobs-act-2-0-congressman-mchenrys-cure-six-deadly-sins-crowdfunding
-regulation.
55. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003).
56. Id. at 1076–77.
57. Id. at 1077.
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tors.58 Of course all investors face these problems, but startup
investors face them in spades due to the unique nature of
startups.
B. HOW VCS MITIGATE THE RISKS OF STARTUP INVESTMENTS
VCs mitigate these extreme risks in startup investing
through the use of detailed investment contracts. Staged financing, or releasing money over time once a startup achieves
certain pre-set milestones, makes the startup‘s prospects clearer before subsequent funds are released and reduces the entrepreneur‘s informational advantage.59 Staged financing also incentivizes the entrepreneur to succeed in order to receive more
funds, therefore also reducing agency costs.60 Staged financing
is thus a powerful tool VCs use for mitigating risk in startup
funding.61
In addition to staged financing, VCs take preferred stock
with liquidation preferences in exchange for their investments,
which signals the entrepreneur‘s belief that the startup will be
worth more than these preferences.62 VCs also contract for
board representation that likely exceeds the number of directors they could elect by voting their shares.63 Due to the
preeminence of the board in corporate governance, the VC‘s

58. Id.
59. Id. at 1078–79; see also Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial
Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture
Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 304 (2003) (discussing VCs‘ use
of staged financing).
60. Gilson, supra note 55, at 1079–80.
61. Michael Klausner and Kate Litvak describe staged financing as the
―[m]ost important‖ of all the VC‘s risk-reduction techniques. Michael Klausner
& Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 56 (Michael
J. Whincop ed., 2001) (―Most important among these contract terms is the
staged nature of the venture capital investment.‖); see also Fisch, supra note
10, at 61 (―Active involvement together with staged financing allows venture
capitalists to address the information and agency problems of the small business better than public equity.‖).
62. Klausner & Litvak, supra note 61.
63. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 988–89 (2006) (arguing that so-called
―independent‖ directors on startup boards are often chosen by the VC and are
likely to side with the VC in any contested board vote, giving the VC control of
the board in more cases than it would otherwise appear); cf. Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
461, 462–63 (2010) (showing that VCs have less control over the appointment
of independent directors than is commonly thought).
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board control also reduces agency costs.64 VCs also employ other formal mechanisms, such as protective provisions that allow
them to control exit decisions, which likewise mitigate the trio
of investment problems that would otherwise make startup investments undesirable.65
C. HOW ANGELS MITIGATE THE RISKS OF STARTUP
INVESTMENTS
As I have previously written, angel investors fund startups
that are even earlier stage and thus present even higher degrees of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency
costs.66 Yet angels use none of the VC‘s contractual protections
to guard their investments.67 This is, in important part, because angels use informal means of reducing investment
risks.68
First, ex ante, angels generally invest only in technical areas with which they are familiar, thus reducing uncertainty and
the entrepreneur‘s informal advantage.69 Angels are experts in
the technical fields they invest in, usually having made their
investment capital from a successful exit in their own startup.70
Angels also get their deal flow from a network of trusted advisors. This network ―serves an important screening and sorting
function by funneling high-quality deals to angels while exclud64. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 559 n.65 (2003).
65. Gilson, supra note 55, at 1084–85.
66. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1420 (2008) (―[B]ecause angels invest at an
earlier stage than venture capitalists, when a start-up has no operating history whatsoever, [this trio of] problems [is] even more acute than at the time
venture capitalists invest.‖).
67. See id. at 1421 (―[T]he investment contracts used by traditional angels
differ dramatically from those used by venture capitalists because they provide far less investor protection.‖).
68. Angels eschew detailed investment contracts for other reasons, too,
including that aggressive contracts could hinder follow-on VC investments and
because angel investments are too small to justify elaborate protective devices.
See id. at 1428–31 (discussing the need for follow-on VC funding); id. at 1433–
35 (discussing the cost of contracting).
69. See id. at 1431–32; see also Fisch, supra note 10, at 86 (―[A]ngels frequently have substantial expertise in the industry in which they invest.‖).
70. Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1419 (―Most angels are ex-entrepreneurs
themselves . . . .‖). Compare that with VCs, who are usually finance types rather than ex-entrepreneurs. MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON,
ANGEL INVESTING 109 (Jossey-Bass Inc. 2000) (observing that ―venture capitalists for the most part have little entrepreneurial experience‖ and are instead ―financial MBA-types‖).

IBRAHIM_4fmt

576

1/3/2016 1:00 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[100:561

ing low-quality deals.‖71 Angels also screen startups in-person
(perhaps several times).72
Second, ex post, angels routinely visit and engage with the
entrepreneurs they fund, which reduces agency costs.73 As Andrew Wong has noted, angels invest no more than a two-hour
drive from their investments,74 and this creates a ―localized
bond of trust . . . . . .[that makes] formal control mechanisms
unnecessary.‖75 Importantly, entrepreneurs have traditionally
wanted angel participation (and VC participation through the
board).76 The value-added services angels and VCs provide
through their advice, experiences, connections, and empathy
are said to be as important to entrepreneurs as the investors‘
money.77 The need for value-added services from investors becomes important to our story later.78
III. WHY TITLE II SITES ARE SUCCEEDING
The previous Part explained why traditional angel and VC
investing has worked so well prior to the rise of online platforms for startup investing. However, any realist must
acknowledge that entrepreneurial finance‘s move to cyberspace
is inevitable.79 As it becomes possible to fund startups with less
cash, the VC‘s deep pockets are no longer necessary. Furthermore, it is cheaper and more efficient to raise money online,
thus allowing entrepreneurs to spend less time fundraising and
more time developing their businesses. But despite these advantages, will Title II work without following the traditional
Silicon-Valley blueprint? This Part discusses Title II‘s success
71.
72.
73.
74.

Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1432.
Id. at 1444.
Id. at 1433.
MIT ENTREPRENEURSHIP CTR., VENTURE SUPPORT SYSTEMS PROJECT:
ANGEL INVESTORS 32 (Feb. 2000), http://ocw/mit/edu/courses/sloan-school-of
-management/15-975-special-seminar-in-management-the-nuts-and-bolts-of
-business-plans-january-iap-2005/readings/angelreport.pdf (―Most active angels will not invest in opportunities outside a 1-2 hour driving range.‖).
75. Andrew Wong, Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital, in VENTURE
CAPITAL: INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, STRUCTURES, AND POLICIES 347–64 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2010).
76. Gilson, supra note 55, at 1075 (―[T]he venture capital fund‘s noncash
contributions have special value to early stage companies.‖).
77. Id.
78. See infra notes 145–52 and accompanying text.
79. See Sean M. O‘Connor, Crowdfunding‟s Impact on Start-Up IP Strategy, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895, 896 (2014) (―Notwithstanding . . . criticisms,
enterprise crowdfunding will become a reality sooner rather than later, and
tech start-ups will be among the first to explore using it.‖).
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so far and contends that on close examination it is not all that
surprising.
A. TITLE II SITES SUCCESS SO FAR
Several Title II sites have come into existence since the
JOBS Act was passed. By any measure, including funds raised
by these sites for their own operations and startups using these
sites to successfully raise funds, these Title II sites are off to a
promising start. According to one observer, ―investments made
through crowdfunding platforms have grown each quarter and
will continue to grow.‖80 The most notable of these sites include
AngelList, FundersClub, and CircleUp.
AngelList has an interesting history. Naval Ravikant, the
co-founder, originally ―co-founded Epinions, an early online reviews site, but felt cheated out of proceeds from the company‘s
sale to EBay.‖81 After a lawsuit against their VC backers in
Epinions, ―Ravikant channeled his disappointment into a blog
called Venture Hacks . . . [which] offered dealmaking tips to
startups.‖82 In 2010 VentureHacks became AngelList, which
went from widely distributed e-mail to a networking website.83
In 2013 alone, ―500 startups raised $125 million‖ through AngelList, according to Ravikant.84 AngelList has rivals, such as
Gust, but ―so far, no one has replicated the appeal of AngelList.‖85
FundersClub bills itself as an online venture capital firm.
By mid-2013, FundersClub (accelerated through the wellknown Y Combinator out of Silicon Valley86) had ―raised $6.5
million for itself‖ and ―also collected $7.2 million for its 31 port-

80. Kay Koplovitz, Equity Crowdfunding at Year One, What‟s the Impact?,
FORBES (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kaykoplovitz/2014/09/26/
equity-crowdfunding-at-year-one-whats-the-impact (quoting Luan Cox, cofounder and CEO of Crowdnetic).
81. Brad Stone, AngelList, the Social Network for Startups, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-01-16/ angellist-the-social-network-for-startups.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. Andrew Davidson, Follow the Money: AngelList Has Blown Open Early-Stage Investments, WIRED (May 17, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/
magazine/archive/2013/05/features/follow-the-money.
86. For a history of Y Combinator, see RANDALL STROSS, THE LAUNCH
PAD: INSIDE Y COMBINATOR, SILICON VALLEY‘S MOST EXCLUSIVE SCHOOL FOR
STARTUPS (2012).
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folio companies from its crowd of 6,700 investors.‖87 ―In February [2014], the company released its first prediction of return
on investment for funders on the platform—41.2%.‖88
CircleUp, itself a successful startup (also accelerated
through Y Combinator),89 claims that since its launch in 2012 it
has raised over $40 million for 40 startups.90 CircleUp does not
raise money for tech-based companies, instead focusing on consumer products companies,91 but, importantly, it still caters to
growth startups as opposed to lifestyle firms. As CircleUp‘s cofounder explains, ―[w]e don‘t have any companies on the site
who are looking at it as a lifestyle business,‖ noting that ―typically these companies will exit to a private equity fund or strategic acquisition.‖92
Several other Title II platforms join AngelList, FundersClub, and CircleUp as innovators in this space. For example, Microventures, described as ―an online venture capital
platform,‖93 had raised over $50 million for its portfolio compa87. Josh Constine, FundersClub Ditches Dumb Money by Going InviteOnly, TECH CRUNCH (Aug. 16, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/16/
fundersclub-invite-only.
88. Laura Baverman, FundersClub Fills Void for Start-Up Investors, USA
TODAY (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/
03/17/baverman-funders-club-online-venture-fund/6291007.
89. See Lora Kolodny, CircleUp Raises $14M To Crowdfund Anything but
Tech, WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Mar. 26, 2014), http://
blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/03/26/circleup-raises-14m-to-crowdfund
-anything-but-tech (noting the $14M Series B financing CircleUp raised from
Canaan Partners and others, including previous backers ―Google Ventures,
Union Square Ventures, Maveron and Rose Park Advisors‖); Lora Kolodny,
Johnson & Johnson Partners with CircleUp for Early Look at Startups, WALL
ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (July 31, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/
venturecapital/2014/07/31/johnson-johnson-partners-with-circleup-for-early
-look-at-startups (noting that 4,000 startups have applied to raise funds on
CircleUp as of mid-2014, and that CircleUp has partnered with consumer
products giant Johnson & Johnson).
90. Alois, supra note 43.
91. See Lora Kolodny, Collaborative Fund, CircleUp Partner To Invest $4
Million in B Corps, WALL ST. J.: VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/08/18/collaborative-fund-circleup
-partner-to-invest-4-million-in-b-corps (describing CircleUp as ―the fundraising platform for ‗anything but tech‘ startups‖).
92. Christine Lagorio-Chafkin, CircleUp Draws More Investors as Equity
Crowdfunding Gains Ground, INC.COM (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.inc.com/
christine-lagorio/circleup-bright-spot-crowdfunding.html.
93. JD Alois, Microventures Claims $50 Million Equity Crowdfunding
Milestone, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider
.com/2014/09/49869-microventures-claims-50-million-equity-crowdfunding
-milestone.
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nies as of September 2014.94 Other Title II sites include We Are
Crowdfunding,95 WeFunder,96 and EarlyShares97 who have all
enjoyed early success.
B. THE PUZZLE: SUCCEEDING YET NOT FOLLOWING THE
BLUEPRINT
The success of Title II is somewhat surprising, at least on
first analysis. It would appear that moving operations online
would weaken the close networks and geographic locality that
explain traditional angel/VC success. If an angel investor from
Virginia funds a startup in Silicon Valley—the very geographic
dispersion the Internet is meant to foster—the angel can no
longer use traditional pre- and post-investment risk-reducing
mechanisms. Relatedly, history is not on the side of Title II.
The first attempt at an Internet matching service for entrepreneurs and angels, ACE-Net, failed miserably over a decade
ago.98
To tie back into our discussion in the previous Part, consider the inapplicability of the VC model to Title II funded
startups. Title II sites are catering to the modern startup—the
―capital-efficient‖ startup.99 It is now the case that many
startups need less money to launch and grow.100 For example,
94. Id.
95. Janet Levaux, RCAP‟s Crowdfunding Site: A Smart Move?, THINKADVISOR
(Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2014/09/08/rcaps
-crowdfunding-site-a-smart-move (―We Are Crowdfunding . . . lets accredited
investors and others buy public and private offerings online by pooling their
resources.‖).
96. Ryan Lawler, Y Combinator-Backed WeFunder Launches To Bring
Crowdfunding Startups to the Masses, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 19, 2013), http://
techcrunch.com/2013/03/19/wefunder-launch.
97. Samantha Hurst, Electric Vehicle Technology Company Brammo
Chooses Equity Crowdfunding Platform EarlyShares for Its $3 Million Capital
Raise, CROWD FUND INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.crowdfundinsider
.com/2014/09/50820-electric-vehicle-technology-company-brammo-chooses
-equity-crowdfunding-platform-earlyshares-3-million-capital-raise.
98. See infra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
99. Another way of describing these startups is ―lean.‖ The ―lean startup‖
develops a base product then adapts the product quickly based on consumer
feedback. See ERIC REIS, THE LEAN STARTUP: HOW TODAY‘S ENTREPRENEURS
USE CONTINUOUS INNOVATION TO CREATE RADICALLY SUCCESSFUL BUSINESSES 8–11 (2011) (summarizing the lean startup method). See generally
Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-Backed Startups Reject Venture Capital?, 3
MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 251, 256–57 (2013) (noting ―capitalefficient‖ startups are the new reality and that deep pockets are no longer necessary).
100. Many startups may be able to ―bootstrap‖ their way to profitability,
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the cost of launching a software startup has diminished greatly
over the past decade.101 One important driver is the advent of
cloud computing, which allows startups to avoid purchasing
expensive servers and to ―manage various functions in a costefficient way.‖102 Also, the hottest sector these days, social media and entertainment (including app development), requires
little capital to launch compared to ―capital-intensive‖ sectors
such as biotech and clean technology.103 For these technologies,
incubators and accelerators like Y Combinator are also helping
to fast-track startup development.104
The VC model does not work well for cash-efficient
startups. VCs have historically not invested in a Series A
round105 for less than $5 million due to the returns they seek
and human capital (e.g., board representation) required for
each investment.106 Recall that once they invest, VCs rely on
detailed investment contracts whose most important protection

even if it is a slower climb. According to one author, ―[t]he most dangerous and
insidious thing that‘s happening with our entrepreneurs today is that they
come out of school and believe that they cannot build a business without [debt
or venture] capital.‖ Gwen Moran, Go It Alone, ENTREPRENEUR MAG., Aug.
2012, at 66–67 (quoting author Dileep Rao); see Kelvin W. Willoughby, How
Do Entrepreneurial Technology Firms Really Get Financed, and What Difference Does It Make?, 5 INT‘L. J. INNOVATION & TECH. MGMT. 1, 6 (2008) (arguing that unorthodox bootstrap financing is the leading type of entrepreneurial
finance for tech firms).
101. Ibrahim, supra note 99, at 256; see also Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities: Tomorrow‟s Economy, Yesterday‟s Start-ups, 2 MICH. J. PRIV. EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 227 (2013) (―The most notable lean-start-up successes are Internet-related companies. But the principles are intended to be
more generally applicable.‖).
102. John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture
Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 133, 156 (2014); see also Cable, supra note 101, at
226 (―The wide availability of cloud computing services from large vendors like
Amazon can eliminate the need to obtain and maintain expensive equipment.‖).
103. See Ibrahim, supra note 99, at 257.
104. See KEVIN LAWTON & DAN MAROM, THE CROWDFUNDING REVOLUTION: SOCIAL NETWORKING MEETS VENTURE FINANCING 57 (2010) (―Have you
noticed that of recent, incubator-style funding mechanisms are popping up
everywhere like weeds?‖).
105. The ―Series A‖ round is typically the first round of serious capital from
professional investors.
106. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and False Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 98 n.225 (2006) (―For instance, for all of the primary VC investment sectors, the average size of a firstround equity financing increased from approximately $1 million in 1980 to
over $5.2 million in 2003 in inflation-adjusted dollars.‖). Of course early-stage
VCs who act more like angel groups will have a lower minimum investment.
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may be staged financing.107 If a startup requires less than the
VC‘s first-round investment for its entire life cycle, the VC‘s detailed contracts and staged financing do not work.
Now consider the seeming inapplicability of the angels‘
model to Title II startups. Ex ante, angels rely on personal connections and networks of trust to screen investments. The Internet, however, is impersonal and negates the traditional intimacy in angel deal flow. Ex post, angels routinely participate
in venture development, visiting the startup frequently and
talking through problems with entrepreneurs. Again, the lack
of locality brought on by the Internet makes such participation
impossible, thus removing another informal means of risk reduction available to the online investor.
Indeed, this analysis explains why ACE-Net, the first Internet matching service for entrepreneurs and angels, failed.
ACE-Net was launched over fifteen years ago and was made
possible even before Title II under a no-action letter from the
SEC.108 ACE-Net was described as a ―cross between a blinddating service and an initial public offering.‖109 It was a joint
project of several government agencies (although driven by the
Small Business Administration) and was limited to accredited
investors.110 Yet ACE-Net died a slow death.111 The postmortem was summed up nicely by securities lawyer Mark Hiraide,
who noted that ―[W]ithout an active connection between entrepreneurs and the investment community, deals did not get
107. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text.
108. Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No-Action Letter, [1997
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,305, at ¶ 77,516 (Oct. 25,
1996).
109. Dennis Berman, ACE-Net: A Tough Way To Find an Angel, BUS. WK.
(Aug. 13, 1998), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/news/date/9808/
e980813a.htm.
110. Zoltan J. Acs & Fred A. Tarpley Jr., The Angel Capital Electronic
Network (ACE-Net), 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 793, 795 (1998) (―ACE-Net is a
partnership between the Office of Advocacy, the US Small Business Administration, and US Department of Defense, in collaboration with the [SEC and
state securities administrations].‖); Fisch, supra note 10, at 64 (―ACE-Net, the
Small Business Administration‘s Internet-based matching service, was developed . . . to facilitate the matching of angel investors with small businesses
seeking capital.‖).
111. David Worrell, Guardian Angels, ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 28, 2005),
http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/76266 (―After the SBA gave up its central
role in the organization in 2000, the ACE-Net website seemed to be more or
less abandoned and neglected.‖); see id. (noting that a second attempt was
made when ACE-Net was revamped as ―Active Capital‖ with a new web address). When I checked on November 2, 2015, that website no longer existed.
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done.‖112 This would seem to confirm the necessity of close networks for entrepreneurial finance‘s success. ACE-Net will be
discussed again in more depth later.113
C. THE SOLUTION: WHY TITLE II SITES ARE SUCCEEDING
Despite the seeming divergence between traditional angel/VC models of risk reduction and Title II, I revealed that Title II sites appear to be succeeding. What explains this success?
My argument is that on closer examination, Title II sites are
still acting under the traditional angel model in important respects, even if there are differences.114 Title II sites could fairly
be described as traditional angel networks that have migrated
online for two reasons: 1) to reduce the transaction costs of operations; and 2) to add new, passive angels at a low cost.
1. Title II Sites Are Really the Same As Traditional
Entrepreneurial Finance
Title II sites are replicating angel risk-reduction mechanisms in an online setting. First, consider the angel‘s traditional means of reducing uncertainty and information asymmetry
pre-investment. Angels rely on networks of trusted associates
and their own expertise to find high-quality deal flow. How is
this replicated online? To answer, we must first understand the
difference between ―active‖ and ―passive‖ angels. Angels have
always invested in small groups, or syndicates, that include a
mix of active angels and passive angels.115 Active angels are the
lead investors—they likely have expertise in the technology at
hand, conduct the due diligence, and negotiate the terms of the
investment. Passive angels, on the other hand, are along for the
ride, contributing their cash but piggybacking on the active angel‘s expertise and reputations.116
112. Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 12 (2011) (statement of Mark T. Hiraide, Partner, Petillon,
Hiraide & Loomis, LLP).
113. See infra notes 214–16 and accompanying text.
114. It makes sense that the angel model would translate better to Title II.
As Paul Graham, founder of Y Combinator, notes, ―Venture capitalists are fast
followers . . . [who] don‘t try to predict what will win. They just try to notice
quickly when something is already winning. But angels have to be able to predict.‖ STROSS, supra note 86, at 86–87.
115. Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1424 (―Angels have long syndicated their
investments with angel investment teams comprised of anywhere from six to
twelve ‗active‘ and ‗passive‘ angels.‖).
116. See Fisch, supra note 10, at 62 (―Angels range from financially sophis-
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Applying this to Title II sites, what we find is that our hypothetical Virginia investor is likely a passive angel who is contributing cash but nothing else. Ex ante, an active angel (or
equivalent) is doing the screening and selecting of the startup.
Consider FundersClub as an example. FundersClub has an
―Investment Committee‖ that prescreens startups that wish to
list on the site.117 In fact, that Investment Committee accepts
less than two percent of startups that seek to list on FundersClub‘s site.118 In addition to its own expertise, FundersClub‘s Investment Committee is relying on its own network
of trust. So far, it has only listed startups that have graduated
from a top accelerator.119 This process of obtaining high-quality
deal flow from a trusted source, coupled with the investor‘s own
expertise, is highly reminiscent of pre-Internet angel practice.120
AngelList filters its investments differently. Rather than
prescreen startups that can list on the site, AngelList has a
ticated investors who take an active monitoring approach to relatively unsophisticated and passive investors.‖).
117. Matthew Zeitlin, FundersClub Takes Crowdsourcing Approach to Early-Stage Venture Capital, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 3, 2013, 5:45 AM), http://
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/03/03/fundersclub-takes-crowdsourcing
-approach-to-early-stage-venture-capital.html (―[A]n investing committee for
the company screens startups that could be hosted on the platform. FundersClub then hosts a few at a time . . . .‖).
118. Baverman, supra note 88 (―FundersClub acts like a traditional venture capital fund in some ways, screening thousands of start-ups and funding
1.8% of applicants.‖). CircleUp accepts less than two percent of companies hoping to be listed on its website. Ryan Caldbeck, Why We Are Picky: The Importance of Curation in Crowdfunding, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancaldbeck/2012/11/20/why-we-are-picky-the
-importance-of-curation-in-crowdfunding; cf. William Alden, Crowdfunding
Site CircleUp Raises $14 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014, 7:31 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/crowdfunding-site-circleup-raises-14
-million (―CircleUp offers investors equity in small consumer and retail companies, which are vetted to weed out potential duds.‖).
119. Zeitlin, supra note 117 (―FundersClub so far has hosted only companies that have come out of the startup accelerators 500 Startups and Y Combinator (FundersClub itself is a Y Combinator alumnus).‖).
120. See Caldbeck, supra note 118; How FundersClub Selects Companies,
FUNDERSCLUB.COM, https://fundersclub.com/vetting (last visited Nov. 2, 2015)
(describing a process that closely resembles a traditional VC or angel screening process). MicroVentures follows a similar process, and claims they review
potential listings with the ―same level of rigor as traditional Venture Capital
companies.‖ Investors, MICROVENTURES.COM, https://microventures.com/
investors (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). EarlyShares also conducts due diligence
to decide whether a startup should be listed on its site. Frequently Asked
Questions, EARLYSHARES.COM, http://www.earlyshares.com/learn-more/how-it
-works/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
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more open listing policy. However, investors still receive signals of startup quality through the concept of ―social proof.‖ 121
Social proof works by showing new investors which startups
other investors, including prominent investors, are funding. As
one former AngelList investor writes, ―Nearly every email [AngelList] send[s] includes names of people or firms who‘ve committed to invest.‖122 Top angels, by followers, on AngelList are
household names: Reid Hoffman (founder of LinkedIn), Marissa
Mayer (CEO of Yahoo), and the actor Ashton Kutcher.123 In
mid-May 2013, Hoffman ―was the most tracked investor on AngelList with 21,558 followers.‖124 AngelList makes it possible
for new passive angels to piggyback on Hoffman‘s (and others‘)
expertise when selecting which startups to fund.125 Indeed, AngelList has a function called ―syndicate,‖ which operates in exactly the same way as a traditional angel syndicate, except
online.126 New investors are passive and turn over decisionmaking to an active angel.
The preceding examples show that, on the ex ante side,
traditional screening mechanisms of expert angels and means
of obtaining high-quality deal flow are alive and well on the Internet under Title II. What about ex post investment, where
routine participation in a venture‘s development reduces the
angel‘s agency costs? This does not seem possible given the geographic dispersion of investors over the Internet.
On closer examination, however, the most successful Title
II sites seek to screen not only startups, but also investors,
making sure to attract those investors who can contribute value-added services. FundersClub is an invitation-only site on the
investor side too.127 FundersClub is wary of the ―potential for
equity crowdfunders to only provide . . . . ‗dumb money‘‖ with121. Why I Deleted My AngelList Account, BRYCE DOT VC, http://bryce
.vc/post/3520840379/why-i-deleted-my-angellist-account (last visited Nov. 2,
2015) (discussing AngelList‘s use of ―social proof‖).
122. Id.
123. Davidson, supra note 85.
124. Id.
125. WeFunder uses something similar called the ―haystack.‖ The haystack
is ―a tool that allows [investors] to quickly flip through new companies and
rate them.‖ Common Questions, WEFUNDER.COM, https://wefunder.com/faq/
common_questions (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). Once a startup‘s profile earns a
positive rating, it is promoted out of the haystack and onto WeFunder‘s ―Top
Startups‖ page. Id.
126. Stone, supra note 81 (―[S]yndicates lets users pool their money alongside a single well-connected angel.‖).
127. Constine, supra note 87.
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out value-added services.128 Similarly, AngelList ―only allows
accredited investors who can help a startup in tangible ways,
not just those who provide capital.‖129 Despite these statements, it is difficult to believe that, with the expanded reach of
Title II, there are not plenty of investors on Title II sites who do
not contribute value-added services. That should not be a problem so long as there are active angels who do provide these services, with new investors in a passive role. The leading investors on AngelList and FundersClub are likely closely
monitoring their startups post-investment.130 Further, the ease
of adding passive angels who do not contribute value-added
services is one of the benefits of Title II, as explained below.
2. Title II Sites Reduce Transaction Costs and Add Passive
Angels at Low Cost
If Title II sites are the functional equivalent of traditional
entrepreneurial finance, why not just stick with traditional entrepreneurial finance? Why would angels or VCs use the Internet? My answer is twofold: (1) the Internet reduces the transaction costs of angel/VC operations; and (2) the Internet is a
cheap way to add new, passive angels to existing networks.
First, I argue that the Internet is beneficial to angels and
VCs because it reduces the transaction costs of their operations. That the Internet can reduce the transaction costs of
group organization is nothing new.131 ―Cyberlaw theorists have
pointed to network effects and lower transaction costs as contributing factors for increased online production.‖132 Another
128. Id. Indeed, as FundersClub‘s co-founder notes: ―We‘re not trying to
democratize access to start-up investing . . . . We‘re trying to democratize access to investing in the highest-promise start-ups.‖ Baverman, supra note 88.
129. Tomio Geron, The Most Influential Angel Investors on AngelList,
FORBES (May 1, 2012, 3:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/
2012/05/01/the-most-influential-angel-investors-on-angellist.
130. Unfortunately I have no evidence at this early stage in the life of Title
II of the extent to which investors are interacting with entrepreneurs postinvestment.
131. See Nathaniel J. Gleicher, Moneybombs and Democratic Participation:
Regulating Fundraising by Online Intermediaries, 70 MD. L. REV. 750, 766
(2011) (―Online organizations radically reduce [transaction] costs by using email instead of traditional mail and by relying on the Internet to connect with
and organize their members.‖). See generally CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008) (discussing the ways in which groups have effectively used the Internet to organize).
132. Salil K. Mehra, Paradise Is a Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, and
User Dynamism, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 889, 900 (2011) (citing YOCHAI
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commentator observed that ―the Internet is a perfect medium
for eliminating the middleman and transaction costs stemming
from organizational structure.‖133 For example, Title II sites
are attempting to make the process of investing more like oneclick shopping on Amazon.134 Angel investors easily sharing
best practices online is another example of the Internet reducing transaction costs.135
Second, angels and VCs are using Title II to attract more
sources of funding at a low cost. More investors tagging along
to Reid Hoffman‘s investments simply allows Hoffman to fund
more, and larger, startups. His transaction costs of finding this
new money are extremely low. As one commentator put it: ―AngelList has done for deal flow what Facebook did for keeping up
with your friends. The site has transformed deal flow from an
activity requiring active intention into one where you can sit
back and let the cash come to you.‖136 Further, the money
comes with no strings, as the anonymity and geographic spread
of the Internet allows Hoffman to advise and monitor the
startup without co-investor interference.
Here we return again to ACE-Net (and not for the last
time). One important reason that ACE-Net failed was that it
did not replicate offline angel operations. There was no screening of startups prior to listing on ACE-Net or ―social proof‖ type
concepts after listing. ACE-Net was a completely hands-off intermediary.137 We shall see that other than its accreditedBENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 3–5 (2006)).
133. Jyh-An Lee, Organizing the Unorganized: The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in the Commons Communities, 50 JURIMETRICS 275, 324 (2010).
134. What is AngelList?, THE SECRET OF RAISING MONEY (Feb. 17, 2014),
http://blog.thesecretofraisingmoney.com/whatisangellist (AngelList uses Invest
Online, where ―funding is now just a couple clicks away‖ and which is ―akin
[to] shopping on Amazon‖); cf. Colleen Taylor, Backed with $1.5M, CircleUp
Aims To Be the AngelList for Consumer and Retail Startups, TECHCRUNCH
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/18/circleup (―CircleUp also
serves as a broker-dealer to allow the funding transactions to take place via
the site.‖).
135. Best Practices for Angel Investors and Entrepreneurs, ANGELBLOG,
http://www.angelblog.net (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (―Angel investing will get
to the same state of development [as VCs] even faster because we can now exchange and develop ideas on the internet.‖).
136. Evan Burfield, The Changing Nature of Angel Investing, 1776 (May
16, 2014), http://www.1776.vc/insights/the-changing-nature-of-angel-investing.
137. Acs & Tarpley, supra note 110, at 796 (describing the myriad of restrictions on ACE-Net‘s involvement with companies and transactions imposed by the SEC No-Action letter that based ACE-Net possible before JOBS
Act Title II).
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investor-only limitation, ACE-Net more closely resembles a Title III site than a Title II site. Why it was not successful as a
Title III-type site is an important part of the next Part‘s discussion.
IV. TITLE III AND EQUITY CROWDFUNDING: A LEMONS
PROBLEM?
The previous Part argued that Title II sites are not equity
crowdfunding at all, but traditional networks of angels and VCs
operating online to reduce transaction costs and add passive
investors at a low cost. As such, they are virtually the same
markets as have traditionally existed, and therefore history
shows they are not lemons markets.
Title III, on the other hand, is a paradigm shift. This is not
simply moving a current network online, but creating a new
one altogether. This is because: (1) Title III is more than moving existing networks online; unaccredited investors are not
part of existing angel/VC networks, and thus their inclusion
would form new networks of players unknown to each other; (2)
given the sheer number of unaccredited versus accredited investors, this would more closely resemble a non-expert based
―wisdom of the crowds‖ situation than piggybacking on expert
investors;138 and (3) given the foregoing, the identity and quality of the entrepreneurs, investors, and matchmaking sites under Title III might be different.
A. TITLE III AS A VIABLE MARKET?
From the outset, it must be emphasized that what follows
are my predictions for Title III, which are, at this point, an educated guess since it has not yet been implemented. Twelve
states have evidently tired of waiting for the SEC to act on Title III and have implemented their own intrastate Title III-like
exemptions.139 However, my preliminary review of those ex138. Crowdfunding also by its nature implies a significant number of investors each contributing small sums of capital. See Joan MacLeod Heminway &
Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011) (―[T]he idea of crowdfunding
is to obtain [funds] from a large audience (the ‗crowd‘), where each individual
will provide a very small amount.‖).
139. These states are: Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin. N.
AM. SEC. ADMINISTRATORS ASS‘N, (Aug. 1, 2015), http://nasaa.cdn.s3
.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/NASAA-Crowdfunding-Index_8
-1-2015a1.pdf.
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emptions finds that they have not been used much, and, therefore, are unlikely to inform us about how the federal exemption
will play.140
There are two important and interrelated questions that
must be answered to determine Title III‘s viability. First, what
subset of entrepreneurs will Title III attract? Is it only the lemons—the low-quality entrepreneurs who cannot receive funding
through traditional sources or Title II? Or can Title III also attract high-quality startups? Second, and relatedly, will information asymmetry problems be so great under Title III that on
the investor side, dumb money floods the market and skews
valuations? Should this happen, high-quality startups will be
indistinguishable from poor ones, resulting in high-quality
startups exiting Title III, leaving only the lemons behind.
1. What Subset of Startups Would Choose Title III?
Will high-quality startups elect to use Title III to raise
funds once it is implemented? Potential problems jump off the
page. Selling to unaccredited investors involves considerably
more risk than selling to accredited investors, even under relaxed rules. Unsophisticated investors are unlikely to appreciate the significant risk of losing their entire investment in a
startup that fails (as most startups do). Compare this with angels and VCs, who understand that most startups fail and
therefore diversify for protection.141 How is an unaccredited investor supposed to adequately diversify with a relatively small
cap on annual Title III investing?
Piling on, unaccredited investors are more likely to sue if
things go bad.142 Receiving small sums from a multitude of in140. For example, Georgia has the ―Invest Georgia Exemption‖ program,
which was adopted in November 2011. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 590-4-2.08
(2014). This exemption allows businesses to raise up to $1 million and nonaccredited investors can invest up to $10,000. Id. Nevertheless, only six companies had taken advantage of the exemption as of mid-2013. Patrick Clark,
Kansas and Georgia Beat the SEC on Crowdfunding Rules. Now Others Are
Trying, BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 20, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
articles/2013-06-20/kansas-and-georgia-beat-the-sec-on-crowdfunding-rules
-dot-now-others-are-trying.
141. See Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1424 n.91 (citing a prior study supporting the proposition that angels diversify by investing in multiple startups); D.
Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 142 (1998) (―[T]he venture capitalist has a diversified portfolio of opportunities . . . .‖ (quoting Christopher B. Barry, New Directions in Research on Venture Capital Finance, 23 FIN. MGMT. 3, 7–8 (1994))).
142. Absent fraud, the potential for suits in the crowdfunding context is
uncertain at best, however. Consider fiduciary duty suits, a classic means of
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vestors complicates a young startup‘s capital structure, which
can create administrative problems143 and scare away follow-on
financing from angels and VCs.144 Given that Title II platforms
are proving successful and attracting well-known angels and
VCs, who can offer cash and value-added services, wouldn‘t a
rational entrepreneur seek out those investors over the general
public, who can provide only money?145
These problems are real, but despite them, there are two
types of high-quality startups that might elect to use Title III to
raise funds. First, Title III should appeal to high-quality
startups that are too young for ―professional‖ financing under
Title II or traditional methods. In short, these startups are too
early stage for even a $100,000 angel investment to be on the
table. Instead, they might seek only $20,000 to develop a prototype, hire a lawyer to incorporate, or obtain a patent.146 Instead
of bootstrapping with credit cards or hitting up the entrepreneur‘s parents, these startups might look to Title III.
Second, even for high-quality startups that have progressed a bit further, Title III would appeal to that subset of
startups that need cash but do not need value-added services
from investors. I have previously argued that some cashefficient startups—which are good prospects for Title III sites
trying to reduce agency costs for shareholders. First, a shareholder or plaintiff‘s lawyer (depending on whether a suit is direct or derivative) would need to
be sufficiently incentivized to bring suit. This is unlikely for crowdfunded
startups where small individual and even aggregate investments are at stake.
Second, even if suit was brought, most startups fail due to the technology not
working as expected, another competitor being first to market, inability to obtain funding needed for development, or other reasons that would implicate a
director‘s duty of care. As Steven Bradford correctly observes, ―Even in the absence of fraud or self-dealing, many crowdfunded small businesses will fail.‖
Bradford, supra note 10, at 108; see also STROSS, supra note 86, at 14 (quoting
Paul Graham as stating, ―If you start a startup, you‘ll probably fail. Most
startups fail. It‘s the nature of the business‖). Duty of care claims are well
known to be losers in most instances.
143. See John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act‟s Strange Bedfellows: Democracy and Start-Up Company Investing, 62 KAN. L. REV. 357, 368 (2013)
(―[T]he rule of thumb [that startups have fewer investors] often makes good
business sense for start-up companies because, among other reasons, managing relationships with fewer investors involves lower transaction costs.‖).
144. Ibrahim, supra note 66, at 1428–31 (arguing that angels do not overcomplicate their investments so the startups are more attractive for VCs down
the road).
145. See Palmiter, supra note 12, at 389 (―[C]rowdfunding under the JOBS
Act could fizzle or bomb.‖).
146. It might seem that more funding is always better, but this is not the
case. The earlier stage a startup is in, the lower its valuation and thus the
more equity it must give away for a given amount of funding.
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given its annual $1 million cap on fundraising147—should avoid
VCs and stick to angel investors.148 This is because the VC‘s
value-added services are not necessary, and therefore VC cash
is not worth the complications that come with it.149
Title III startups would take the argument one step further
and forego (or delay) angel value-added services as well. A
strong entrepreneurial team might be able to guide a cashefficient startup from launch to a quick sale without much professional help. For cash-efficient startups, equity crowdfunding
under Title III offers a low-cost and readily available source of
capital while keeping decision-making fully in the hands of the
entrepreneur. Compare that with Title II, where the active investors are still presumably hands-on, as in traditional entrepreneurial finance.150 In short, the inherent passivity of Title
III investors—a seeming negative—would actually appeal to
entrepreneurs who wish to unbundle the cash and value-added
service components of traditional entrepreneurial finance.151 In
obtaining only cash from investors, these startups could also
obtain a better price for their shares, as there would be no inherent premium in the share price for value-added services.152
If Title III sites attract high-quality startups under the circumstances envisioned above, it follows that high-quality investors will visit Title III sites to find them. If Title III investors
are predominantly the general public, then sophisticated angels
and VCs would enjoy an informational advantage over these
investors. They could exploit that informational advantage in a
kind of arbitrage, hopping into Title III and picking off good
startups on the cheap.153 In short, Title III‘s inefficiencies could
147. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012).
148. See generally Ibrahim, supra note 99.
149. Id. at 259–65.
150. See supra notes 113–28 and accompanying text.
151. Although it is generally assumed that entrepreneurs benefit from VC
and angel value-added services, this is not a uniformly held view. See Smith,
supra note 141, at 134–35 (examining the risks entrepreneurs face when they
seek value-added services from VCs); cf. Bradford, supra note 10, at 104 (noting that crowdfunded startups will not receive angels‘ and VCs‘ value-added
services, but arguing that ―crowdfunding is not a substitute for venture capital
or angel investing; it is aimed at entrepreneurs who do not have access to such
funding‖).
152. Fisch, supra note 10, at 84 (―Although it is difficult to quantify the
value of management, monitoring and consulting services, the small business‘
cost of capital should include a component of payment for these services in addition to the cost of capital funds.‖).
153. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 789 (1985) (―If
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be exploited by those in the know, which would make it worthwhile for them to invest there.154
2. Avoiding the Lemons Problem: Title III and Information
Asymmetry
If a segment of high-quality entrepreneurs and investors
would be inclined to use Title III, the related question is
whether information asymmetry problems will be so great that
dumb money floods the market and skews valuations in such a
way that the good startups cannot distinguish themselves from
bad ones.
This is a classic ―market for lemons‖ problem. As Zohor
Golshen and Gideon Parchomsvsky succinctly describe it:
A ―lemons market‖ is a market in which asymmetric information exists between sellers and buyers. Since the buyers are not fully informed as to the quality of the products, they discount the price of all
products. High quality products will not sell for a price that reflects
their quality and will, thus, exit the market. Only ―lemons‖ are left in
the market.155

While it is all an educated guess at this point, Title III is
unlikely to replace traditional entrepreneurial finance or Title
II. Startups have historically preferred to use Rule 506 to raise
funds from accredited investors only, and there is unlikely to be
she assumes that the market is inefficient, she would expect to earn extra
profits (though she may fail to do so), and thus would acquire the information.
If she believed that the market was efficient, however, she would recognize
that she could not profit from acquiring the information, and therefore would
lack any incentive to acquire costly information.‖); see also Lynn A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 618 (1988) (explaining
the weak connection between the stock market and the allocation of real resources).
154. It could be argued that this pattern would lead to an unsustainable
result. As Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman write:
Traders would initially acquire information because, in an inefficient
market, they could earn returns on their investment in acquisition.
As more traders became initially informed, however, the price system
would convey more information to uninformed traders, thereby lowering the returns to informed traders. At the point at which the market
became fully efficient, there would be no return to informed traders
for having acquired the information, and, as a result, information acquisition would cease. The market would sink into informational inefficiency once more, only to repeat the cycle as soon as some traders
again found information acquisition profitable.
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 577–78 (1985). I am, however, skeptical that Title III
markets would come to this.
155. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 762 n.192 (2006).
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a sea change toward seeking out unaccredited investors.156 Further, most startups probably still need both an investor‘s cash
and value-added services. Still, Title III will have an important
role to play for very early-stage or niche startups.
a. The Importance of Unaccredited Investors Under Title III
Dumb money is a danger to Title III‘s viability. In traditional entrepreneurial finance and under Title II, smart money
sets a startup valuation. Under Title III, however, if most money is dumb money that is randomly distributed (i.e., not funneled to the best startups), then valuations will be skewed. Exacerbating this concern is that high-quality investors cannot
move pricing by investing significant sums, as in public markets, since all investors are capped in annual investment
amounts.157 Even without these investment caps, I have argued
that part of the Internet‘s attraction for accredited investors is
the ability to add tag-along passive investors at a low cost. In
other words, accredited investors want unaccredited investors
to follow them into startups.
Therefore, if unaccredited investors will mostly populate
Title III, and if their money needs to be funneled to good
startups, it follows that Title III‘s viability depends on solving
the information asymmetry problem for unaccredited investors.
Consequently, the remainder of my discussion focuses on ways
of reducing information asymmetry for unaccredited investors
under Title III.
b. Reducing Information Asymmetry for Unaccredited
Investors
I have already discussed the massive information asymmetry that exists in startup investing generally and how angels
and VCs manage the problem.158 To recap, VCs reduce the entrepreneur‘s informational advantage through staged financing
and other signals of startup quality,159 while angels learn of
156. See supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text.
157. It is true that accredited investors can invest more than unaccredited
investors under these caps, but it is doubtful it will be enough to overcome the
likely greater supply of unaccredited investor money from more unaccredited
participants.
158. See supra notes 55–78 and accompanying text.
159. These include following high-quality angels and other VCs into deals
and using preferred stock versus the entrepreneur‘s common stock. Jeffrey
Trester, Venture Capital Contracting Under Asymmetric Information 5–6
(Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr. Working Paper No. 94-06, Oct. 1993), http://fic
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promising entrepreneurs from networks of trust and bring their
own expertise to bear on familiar technologies.160 Title II imports the traditional angel screening mechanisms to the Internet.161 Therefore, in traditional entrepreneurial finance and
under Title II, high-quality entrepreneurs can distinguish
themselves from low-quality entrepreneurs, and thus we do not
have a market for lemons.
The question is whether the same can be predicted for Title
III. With the paradigm shift that is Title III, networks of trust
do not exist. Instead, the majority of players will likely be unknown to each other. Therefore, we must look for other ways to
reduce information asymmetry for investors and avoid the lemons problem.162 Three possible ways are (i) disclosure; (ii) the
wisdom of crowds; and (iii) the use of reputational intermediaries. These three alternatives are now discussed in turn.
i.

Disclosure

Securities regulation‘s mandatory-disclosure regime is a
classic way of evening the informational playing field between
issuers and investors. As the Supreme Court stated in the famous case of Ralston Purina, the Securities Act of 1933 was intended ―to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment
decisions.‖163
Title III weakens the disclosure required in sales to unaccredited investors. Under Title III, issuers must disclose items
such as the nature of the startup, the names of the directors
and a description of the issuer‘s ownership and capital structure, a description of the current business, the anticipated
business plan, a description of the stated purpose and intended
use of the proceeds of the offering sought by the issuer, the target amount of funding sought from the offering, and the issuer‘s
financial condition, which may include income tax filings and
.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/ 94/9406.pdf.
160. See supra notes 65–78 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 79–145 and accompanying text.
162. Reducing Barriers to Capital Formation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov. Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 11–12 (2013) (statement of Donald C. Langevoort,
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (urging the committee to consider ways to help investors tell the difference
between good and bad actors based on the premise that any innovations made
by the JOBS Act in capital-raising would not work without these safeguards).
163. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
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audited financial statements.164 These are more lenient requirements than what was previously required under Rule 506,
for example, which required unaccredited investors to receive
significant financial and non-financial information. Depending
on certain factors, this disclosure could be the ―same kind of information as [would be] required in Part I of a registration
statement.‖165
At least one prominent scholar, Thomas Hazen, has called
for greater disclosure under Title III.166 Can mandatory disclosure—either of to the extent required by Title III or enhanced,
as Hazen calls for—solve the lemons problem? It is unlikely for
several reasons, including: (1) financial and other illiteracy
among unaccredited investors; (2) the inapplicability of the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) to crowdfunding; and
(3) previous relevant experience in a European market, Germany‘s Neuer Markt.
First, mandatory disclosure is an imperfect fit for the type
of investors that crowdfunding targets. Omri Ben-Shahar and
Carl Schneider have taken a systematic look at why mandatory
disclosure generally fails.167 They argue, on a foundational level, that familiarizing ourselves with disclosure is unpleasant.
They write that, at its core, mandatory disclosure is ―an enormous educational enterprise of a kind academics may enjoy but
that most people do not.‖168 Further, unsophisticated people
―often can‘t read‖ the disclosures, if reading means to ―extract
useful meaning from them.‖169 The authors illuminate three
broad categories of reading comprehension problems: ―illiteracy, innumeracy, and sector illiteracy.‖170 The latter two, and potentially all three, would seem to apply in the crowdfunding
context with nascent startups of a technical nature.171 This is
164. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b) (2012).
165. 17 C.F.R. 230.502(b)(2)(A) (2014).
166. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 1767 (arguing that disclosures ―could be
less burdensome than those currently required under Regulation A, but they
should still be sufficiently detailed to provide investors with sufficient information to enable them to make an informed investment decision‖).
167. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
168. Id. at 56.
169. Id. at 79.
170. Id. at 91.
171. Bradford, supra note 10, at 109–10 (giving statistics and noting that
―[m]any American are not financially literate‖); id. at 112 (―Since crowdfunding sites are usually open to the general public, at least some of the people investing in crowdfunding offerings will not have the basic financial knowledge
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assuming potential investors even attempt to read the disclosures, which is questionable at best.172
Second, while these problems also exist in public markets,
public markets rely at least in part on the ECMH to remedy
them. Under the ECMH, succinctly put, sophisticated investors
move market prices by absorbing disclosures and trading in
significant volumes on that information.173 Unsophisticated investors then rely on the adjusted stock price as a good proxy for
new information about the company.174 While there are certainly well-known criticisms and shortcomings of the ECMH, it is
still at least a crude mechanism that makes disclosure work for
unsophisticated investors in the public markets context. Title
III crowdfunding sites would not be efficient markets, so the
ECMH cannot benefit its unsophisticated participants. As mentioned, accredited investor annual caps under Title III exacerbate the problem by not allowing smart money to adequately
―price up‖ good startups (or ―price down‖ bad ones).
Third, previous experience with a significant disclosure regime for growth companies is instructive. Because the rest of
the world does not have the sophisticated network of private
angels and VCs found in the U.S., efforts have been made to esrequired to understand the risks.‖); Fisch, supra note 10, at 78 (―Small businesses generally have difficulty raising capital because of informational
asymmetries and the inability of investors to judge the quality of the offering.
These deficiencies are not remedied by the type of information that can be
posted on a Web site.‖).
172. Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 932 (noting that the SEC originally ―objected to the dissemination of forward-looking statements, fearing that unsophisticated investors would rely too heavily on this type of speculative information‖).
173. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (introducing the theory
of efficient capital markets).
174. A court describes this process:
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an investor‘s reliance upon information is into the subjective pricing of that information by
that investor. With the presence of a market, the market is interposed
between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the
investor in the processed form of a market price. Thus the market is
performing a substantial part of the valuation process performed by
the investor in a face-to-face transaction. The market is acting as the
unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market
price.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988) (quoting In re LTV Securities
Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
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tablish public markets for growth companies. One such effort at
a junior stock exchange, the Neuer Markt in Germany, imposed
significant regulatory restraints on companies that listed there,
including strict disclosure rules.175 As John Coffee observes, the
Neuer Markt‘s ―requirements were more rigorous than those
specified either by its parent, the Deutsche Boerse, or, more
surprisingly, by the SEC.‖176 Despite these strictures, ―the
Neuer Markt became plagued by scandals and saw its market
capitalization slide by 73% since the end of 1999,‖177 and was
shut down in 2003.178 By contrast, another junior stock exchange for growth companies—London‘s Alternative Investment Market (AIM)—employs a ―light-touch‖ regulatory
scheme (similar to Title III) and has been far more successful.179
To be clear, I am not arguing that Title III startups should
not be subject to mandatory disclosure. Indeed, disclosure is a
must for entrepreneurs to inform potential investors about
their startups and the investment under consideration. What I
am arguing, however, is that there are good reasons to believe
that mandatory disclosure alone will not solve the lemons problem because unaccredited investors will not adequately benefit
from mandatory disclosure under Title III.180 Therefore, we
turn to a second option: the wisdom of crowds.
ii. The Wisdom of the Crowd
The second way that unaccredited investors may not suffer
from information asymmetry is if assembling them over the Internet produces a collective wisdom that would not otherwise
exist. The concept of the ―crowd‖ under Title III is messy and
175. John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of CrossListings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1804 (2002) (―Intended as a market for high
growth firms, the Neuer Markt adopted a unique style by advertising itself as
the ‗most regulated market‘ in Europe.‖).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1805.
178. Coffee claims that ―the fate of Neuer Markt shows less the failure of
heightened disclosure standards than the strength of the network externalities that link firms traded on the same high profile market. Once some firms
on the Neuer Markt became mired in scandals, the Neuer Markt‘s reputation
became tarnished.‖ Id. However, my point is that heightened disclosure, without more, was not sufficient to avoid a market failure in the Neuer Markt.
179. See infra notes 215–24 and accompanying text.
180. I have not even discussed the behavioral biases that may plague unsophisticated investors, which would also cut against a predominantly disclosure-based solution to the potential lemons problem in crowdfunding.
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ambiguous. For example, Joan Heminway actually defines this
hypothetical ―crowd‖ as an ―ill-defined group of potential and
actual investors in securities offered and sold through crowdfunding.‖181
As Heminway notes: ―Crowds can be ‗mad‘—irrational,
foolish, and even stupid. On the other hand, crowds can be
‗wise‘—rational, sensible, and intelligent.‖182 She goes on to
suggest that ―preliminarily indicat[ions are] that the crowd
[under Title III] has the potential for wisdom.‖183 Using James
Surowiecki‘s framework, Heminway notes that Title III crowds
are likely to be heterogeneous, independent, and operate in a
decentralized manner.184
In more general terms, the idea is that crowds may be better at spotting a diamond in the rough than experts. This is especially true where the crowds know something in particular
about the product or technology. Consider a new video game
that a certain group on the Internet is addicted to. This virtual
crowd would better be able to predict this game‘s broader success than an angel or VC who has never played the game (or its
rivals). In these cases, the Title III crowds would fund the good
game and not its rivals, thus resulting in correct pricing and no
lemons market.
Much like AngelList‘s concept of social proof, a knowledgeable segment of the crowd would benefit the unknowledgeable
rest of the lot—these investors could tag along to the knowledgeable crowd‘s decisions. In one study, early investors in
crowdfunded projects were found to have a significant influence
on later investors.185 In particular, later investors (the ―crowd‖)
were heavily influenced to invest when early investors were either app developers or experienced investors.186 While the early
181. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd,” 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 829
(2014).
182. Id. at 830 (citations omitted).
183. Id. at 845. However, Heminway also correctly notes that ―[s]ignificant
empirical research is needed‖ to determine whether Title III crowds will be
wise or not. Id.
184. Id. at 845–46; see also Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 263, 267–70 (2009) (explaining
that a homogenous group will lead to extremism, not wisdom).
185. Keongtae Kim & Siva Viswanathan, The Experts in the Crowd: The
Role of Reputable Investors in a Crowdfunding Market 3 (Nov. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2258243).
186. Id.
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investors in this study sound like experts, it stands to reason
that a knowledgeable segment of the crowd could serve the
same signaling function for later investors.187
iii. Reputational Intermediaries
Another potential solution to the lemons problem is the use
of reputational intermediaries as a means of signaling startup
quality. Signals are important in solving the lemons problem.
In the classic used car example, dealers signal that their cars
are not lemons by issuing a warranty.188 In securities markets,
reputational intermediaries such as accountants and investment banks offer signals of quality for the companies they represent, thereby reducing information asymmetries for potential
investors.189 As Bernard Black writes: ―The principal role of
reputational intermediaries is to vouch for disclosure quality
and thereby reduce information asymmetry in securities markets.‖190 These repeat players‘ reputations are tied to the companies they represent, and thus they have incentives to guard
against the companies failing or committing fraud.191
Signaling is not that important for the accredited investors
187. Id. at 7 (citing studies finding that social networks of early investors
can influence later investors in non-equity based crowdfunding projects).
188. Akerlof, supra note 17, at 499–500; Brian JM Quinn, Putting Your
Money Where Your Mouth Is: The Performance of Earnouts in Corporate Acquisitions, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 138 (2012) (―In the context of Akerlof‘s used
cars, a seller might offer a warranty on the quality of the car as an example of
a costly signal to demonstrate the seller‘s confidence in its unobservable quality.‖).
189. Langevoort, supra note 41, at 14 (―[I]nvestors are more likely to rely
on the disclosures when a reputable intermediary is involved, and hence demand less of a risk premium.‖); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O‘Hara, The
Economics of Stock Exchange Listing Fees and Listing Requirements, 11 J.
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 297, 301 (2002).
190. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 788 (2001); see also Goshen
& Parchomovsky, supra note 155, at 763 n.196 (explaining that public company ―issuers attempt to avoid the ‗lemons market‘ by using underwriters, and
underpricing the IPOs (sometimes heavily)‖); Langevoort, supra note 41, at 14
(writing that much attention has been paid to the ―function that financial intermediaries play in signaling and bonding the informational credibility of issuer disclosure‖).
191. See Fisch, supra note 10, at 79 (―Investors may also view the absence
of outside expert involvement in Internet offerings as a negative signal.‖) This
theory of reputational constraints on bad behavior is not without its real-world
exceptions, including Arthur Anderson‘s role in the fall of Enron. See JOHN C.
COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
325–30 (2006) (discussing why reputational constraints failed to cause Arthur
Andersen to more closely monitor Enron).
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who know what they are looking for, or for knowledgeable segments of the crowd (think of the game-players described in the
previous Section), but will be important for everyone else on Title III. Even Title II relies on reputational intermediarysignaling for its tag-along passive investors. Recall that heavy
hitter angels and the ―social proof‖ function signal startup quality under Title II, and FundersClub‘s intensive screening process signals startup quality for those who make it onto the
FundersClub site. Who can serve as reputational intermediary
under Title III?
Again, a look overseas at a junior stock exchange for
growth companies is instructive, but this time we examine the
AIM. The AIM has been the most successful of all of the junior
stock exchanges established worldwide.192 Unlike other ―feeder‖
exchanges to larger stock exchanges, it is not uncommon for
companies to even migrate ―downward‖ from the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) to the AIM.193 While some of AIM‘s success is
attributable to its heavy institutional-investor makeup,194 AIM
has also been touted for its institutional structure for compa192. See Jose Miguel Mendoza, Securities Regulation in Low-Tier Listing
Venues: The Rise of the Alternative Investment Market, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 257, 284 (2008) (explaining that the LSE ―draws praise from investors, firms, and policy-makers alike, due to AIM‘s impressive results since
2000.‖ (footnote omitted)). The AIM has been subject to ebbs and flows, and
not all are convinced of its success. Robert Prentice notes ―AIM has been criticized for being less than diligent in policing fraud among its listing companies.‖ Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of
SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 755 (2007) (footnote omitted). He also observes that that there have been ―an accelerating number of delistings on AIM
and most of its stock are not liquid.‖ Id. at 755–56; see also Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REV. 89, 137 (2007)
(AIM shares are not actively traded). Still, compared to other junior exchanges
worldwide, most point to AIM as having the most success. See generally Mendoza, supra.
193. Michael Potter, Explaining the Continued Rise of London‘s Alternative Investment Market (May 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648835 (―[O]nly 111 companies
have moved from the AIM to the LSE compared with 231 moving in the opposite direction.‖); see also Mendoza, supra note 192, at 287 (―AIM is not merely
a free-rider on London‘s and the LSE‘s reputation. Rather, AIM succeeds because it supplies a scarce product to the marketplace: rapid, low-cost access to
public equity for small firms with high growth potential.‖ (footnote omitted)).
194. Mendoza, supra note 192, at 297 (―[W]ealthy individuals with experience in securities trading, institutional investors, and entities specializing in
AIM investments comprise most of AIM‘s investor base . . . .‖ (footnote omitted)). But see id. (―The LSE does attract more retail investors to AIM by offering certain advantages, including tax breaks for individuals that invest in its
low-tier market segment.‖ (footnote omitted)).
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nies, which consists of ―light-touch‖ regulation coupled with
heavy reliance on Nominated Advisors, or Nomads, for each
listed company.195
Each company who wants to list on AIM must convince one
of the forty-three authorized Nomads to vouch for it.196 ―Most
nomads are investment banks or corporate finance firms.‖197
The Nomad helps its companies establish and abide by good
corporate governance procedures.198 Nomads must sign off on
all non-routine announcements its company makes to the market.199 Nomads act as private regulators for their companies,
even signing off on security sales without direct approval from
the AIM or LSE.200 The LSE considers the Nomad-company relationship so important that if a company terminates its Nomad, trading in the company‘s securities is suspended until it
hires a new Nomad.201 The LSE website contains a more complete description of the Nomad-company relationship, which
reveals its depth and breadth.202
195. The AIM has a ―comply or explain‖ policy. Id. at 295 (―The genius of
AIM‘s regulatory model lies with the comply-or-explain option provided to
each listed company to adapt to the exchange‘s flexible and reduced set of
rules.‖ (footnote omitted)).
196. For a search tool companies can use to find Nomads, see Nomad
Search Engine, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www.londonstockexchange
.com/exchange/companies-and-advisors/aim/for-companies/nomad-search.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
197. Stéphane Rousseau, London Calling?: The Experience of the Alternative Investment Market and the Competitiveness of Canadian Stock Exchanges,
23 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 51, 63 (2007); see also Mendoza, supra note 192, at
316 n.323 (noting that, among qualifications, ―Nomad applicants must (i) have
practiced corporate finance for a period of at least two years‖).
198. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., A GUIDE TO AIM 10 (Nigel Page ed., 2010),
http://www.lseg.com/sites/default/files/content/documents/LSEG_AIM_Guide
.pdf (explaining that a Nomad will, ―[a]mong other things . . . ensure the directors are appropriate and capable of acting as a board for a company . . . [and
the Nomad will] act as the primary regulator‖).
199. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR MAIN MARKET AND AIM COMPANIES 94 (Nigel Page ed. 2012), http://www
.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/publications/
documents/corpgov.pdf.
200. See LONDON STOCK EXCH., supra note 198.
201. See id. at 3.
202. Nomad offers a description of its advising:
A Nomad is responsible for advising and guiding a company on its responsibilities in relation to its admission to AIM as well as its continuing obligations once on market. To help fulfil [sic] this role, the Nomad
will:
*undertake extensive due diligence to ensure a company is suitable for
AIM
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If we envision startup problems that investors might be
worried about as trifold—fraud, measurable qualities (e.g., good
corporate governance practices), and viable business models—
the Nomad appears to tackle the first two. However, given the
identity of the Nomads as corporate finance experts, it is doubtful they do much to tackle the third problem of predicting a viable business model. Nomads are not the equivalents of angels
or VCs in technical know-how or experience; instead, they are
advisors appropriate to help young companies with no prior experience being listed on a securities exchange. As such, Nomads can be held liable to the LSE for ―improper reporting by
their supervised companies‖ and [are] subject to ―investor lawsuits if investors are misled,‖203 but it does not appear that
Nomads are liable for a sponsored company‘s business failure
absent fraud.
Given the close relationship between a Nomad and its
listed companies, the Nomad serves as a classic reputational
intermediary. As described by one commentator, ―[t]he Nomad‘s
role is central to AIM‘s regulatory model, as these entities act
as gatekeepers, advisers, and regulators of AIM-listed companies.‖204 He goes on to observe that ―AIM can be considered a
„reputational market,‟ in which investors rely on the standing of
Nomads as a proxy for the quality of listed companies.‖205 Another commentator contends that the ―signal that investors derive from a company‘s being qualified as suitable for AIM rests
*provide guidance throughout the flotation process
*prepare the company for being on a public market
*help prepare the AIM admission document
*confirm appropriateness of the company to the Exchange
*act as the primary regulator throughout a company‘s time on AIM.
Choosing Your Advisor, LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE, http://www
.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/for-companies/
choosing/advisor.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2015).
203. Mendoza, supra note 192, at 318; see also LONDON STOCK EXCH., supra note 199, at 96 (explaining that the LSE can impose penalties on Nomads
ranging from a monetary fine to a formal censure to a suspension); Rousseau,
supra note 197, at 98–99 (explaining the potential civil liability for Nomads);
Siobhan Kennedy, LSE Hits Nabarro Wells with £250,000 Fine over AIM
Checks, TIMES ONLINE (Oct. 19, 2007), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/
business/industries/banking/article2155593.ece (reporting that the London
Stock Exchange fined Nomad Nabarro Wells £250,000 for failings of ―due skill
and care‖ expected of a Nomad).
204. Mendoza, supra note 192, at 295; see also Rousseau, supra note 197, at
62 (―The nomad is the hallmark of the AIM.‖).
205. Mendoza, supra note 192 at 295–96 (emphasis added); see also id. at
316 (―Without doubt, the comprehensive role of the Nominated Adviser is the
strongest pillar of AIM‘s regulatory model.‖).
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indirectly on their assessment of the nomad‘s reputation,‖206
and that ―the reputation of a [N]omad is its most valuable asset.‖207
The most obvious equivalent to the Nomad under Title III
is the title‘s creation of ―funding portals.‖208 A funding portal is
an ―Internet site that lists crowdfunding opportunities and provides a matching service for interested investors.‖209 In short, it
would be the Title III equivalent to FundersClub or CircleUp.
As a mandated FundersClub or CircleUp, the funding portal is the right idea for avoiding the lemons problem, but it is
poorly executed under Title III. Funding portals are currently
envisioned as passive entities, for the most part, and ―limited to
putting buyers and sellers together.‖210 The funding portal‘s
role is directed at investors, including to ―ensure that investors
review [startup] disclosures, answer various questions, and affirm they understand the risk of loss.‖211 Further, it is tasked
with ensuring investors do not exceed their investment caps.212
My suspicion is that this is fitting with the traditional practice
of the government delegating gatekeeping tasks to private parties.213
Consequently, it is clear that the funding portal‘s primary
relationship is not with the startup at all. Contrast that with
the very different situation on the AIM, where the Nomads primary relationship is with the company, not investors. What is
needed is a funding portal that is more like a Nomad, or a FundersClub—a third party that can engage with startups, screen
out the bad apples, and therefore signal something about the
206. Rousseau, supra note 197, at 94.
207. Id. at 97.
208. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2014). See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, The
New Intermediary on the Block: Funding Portals Under the CROWDFUND
Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 177, 178 (2013) (―This paper focuses on a new,
statutorily ordained and mandated intermediary in certain securities offerings
made through the Internet.‖).
209. Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good
Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1433, 1439 (2012). The funding portal
was a late entry into the JOBS Act, spurred on by fears of fraud. Id.
210. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1462 n.25 (listing five restrictions on funding portal activity that reveal the ACE-Net like passive role of the new funding portals).
211. Hazen, supra note 13, at 1756 (footnote omitted).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583,
1636 (2010) (―Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, gatekeepers face potential civil liability for material misstatements or omissions in the registration
statements of their clients.‖).
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quality of startups that make it on to the site.
What we currently have, however, is a funding portal that
acts almost exactly as ACE-Net did over a decade ago. ACENet, too, was a passive entity limited to putting buyers and
sellers together.214 It could not handle financing transactions,
screen startups, or anything else that required an active role.215
This was in part to avoid being classified as an exchange or
broker-dealer under the securities laws as they existed at the
time.216 Yet ACE-Net was a disaster. And the inability of ACENet to signal anything about the companies it listed is a large
reason why it failed, if the AIM is any indication.
B. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO TITLE III: MAKE FUNDING PORTALS
THE EQUIVALENT OF AIM‘S NOMADS
While the wisdom of the crowds may help to solve the lemons problem under Title III, there are no legal changes that are
needed to facilitate it. However, if we want intermediation as
well, we must re-craft the concept of a ―funding portal‖ under
Title III.
London‘s success with the AIM, whose regulatory structure
is driven by the company-Nomad relationship, is highly instructive for making Title III work on the reputational intermediary front. I contend that Title III should be amended to
change funding portals to make them work like Nomads. The
overarching change needed in Title III is to make the funding
portal‘s primary relationship be with startups, not investors.
The following discussion addresses certain legislative changes
that are needed to accomplish that objective.
First, Title III should be amended to remove all provisions
attempting to detach funding portals and the companies they
list. For example, under Title III as currently written, a funding portal must basically act as a ―neutral third party‖217—an
ACE-Net-like restriction. Consequently, it is not even clear if a
funding portal could host an online discussion among investors
214. See Langevoort, supra note 41, at 8 (observing that with ACE-Net
there is ―the disappearance of the securities professional (i.e., broker-dealer or
investment advisor) as an intermediary . . . [which cannot] offer any investment advice or guidance‖).
215. See Angel Capital Electronic Network, SEC No-Action Letter, supra
note 108 ¶ 77,516.
216. See id. Conversely, the JOBS Act specifically excludes funding portals
as broker-dealer. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(h)(1) (2012).
217. See Jacques F. Baritot, Increasing Protection for Crowdfunding Investors Under the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 259, 277 (2013).
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about the quality of its listed startups that could help investors
choose their investments.218 While companies pay Nomads to
assess their suitability for the AIM and to serve as a Nomad after listing,219 it is unclear what compensation funding portals
could receive from startups.220 To follow AIM‘s example,
startups should be allowed to pay funding portals for their services pre-and post-listing to help attract high quality portals.
Second—the flip side of the coin—Title III‘s attempts to
make the primary relationship between funding portal and investor should be rethought. The AIM experience had nothing of
the sort, so we have no indication that an intermediaryinvestor relationship would be beneficial. Further, Title III‘s
current requirements impose significant costs on funding portals.221 Funding portals‘ time would be better spent checking
and vouching for startups, after which funding portal-approval
could serve as a signal of startup quality. To entice high-quality
entities to act as funding portals, we should keep costs low and
directed to where they really matter. Importantly, I am not
claiming that Title III‘s investor education and funding-limit
checks are unimportant—I put that question aside without further research.222 I am only arguing that the model we have to
learn from—the AIM—suggests funding portals should be tied
to startups, not investors.
Third, furthering the idea of making funding portals re218. See id. (noting that the neutrality rule could prevent message boards,
forums, and the like where investors could rate and share their experiences
with particular startups).
219. See Rousseau, supra note 197, at 96 (―Under the current model, issuers pay nomads to assess whether they are suitable for AIM. They are paid by
companies subsequently to admission to act as their sherpa.‖).
220. See Heminway, supra note 181, at 196–97 (critiquing the strict restrictions on funding portals meant to avoid potential conflicts of interest and
observing that brokers are not subject to the same restrictions); see also Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 274 (2003) (―Someone has to pay for intermediary services, and eliminating conflicts may block
an important source of financing.‖).
221. See Heminway, supra note 208, at 197 (explaining Congress ―may
have crippled the small business financing tool it sought to create in the
CROWDFUND Act by pricing funding portals out of the market‖); see also id.
at 191 (―The CROWDFUND Act adds significant, mandatory burdens (and, as
a result, costs) to this organically grown model—so many burdens, that it may
be difficult for would-be funding portals to develop a profitable business model.‖ (footnote omitted)).
222. See, e.g., Palmiter, supra note 12, at 399–401 (discussing favorably
Title III‘s investor education requirements and citing other scholars who
agree).
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sponsible for their startups, Title III currently only requires
funding portals to do one type of due diligence on the companies that wish to list with them: background checks.223 Recall
that AIM does not allow companies to even list without a Nomad vouching for them, and FundersClub and CircleUp screen
all their potential listings. These screening procedures involve
far more diligence than a background check. Currently, Title
III investors would receive no signal about a startup‘s quality
from the fact that it passed a mere background check before being listed on a funding portal site.
Further, post-listing, Nomads are subject to potential liability from the LSE and investors for their sponsored companies‘ fraud. The JOBS Act clarifies that state securities commissions have enforcement authority over funding portals,224
but under the AIM experience, that authority should lie with
the SEC as a centralized body. Further, the extent of a funding
portal‘s private liability under Title III should be clarified.225
Thinking back to the trifold of potential problems Nomads
could be designed to tackle—fraud, poor governance procedures, and viable business plans—Nomads tackle the first two
but not the third.226 Funding portals, on the other hand, should
focus on a different two—fraud and viable business plans—
which are more important than corporate governance practices
when it comes to nascent startups. The funding portal‘s primary signaling value would be to reveal that listed startups
passed an initial screening for viability as a business and are
not sham companies.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(5) (2012) (requiring funding portals to ―take . . .
measures to reduce the risk of fraud . . . including obtaining a background or
securities enforcement regulatory history check on each officer, director, and
person holding more than 20 percent [of an issuer‘s equity]‖).
224. Id. § 77r(c)(1)(B).
225. See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 208, at 198 (―The CROWDFUND Act
does not expressly impose fiduciary duties on funding portals. However, the
SEC has broad authority under the CROWDFUND Act and the securities laws
in general to promulgate rules and regulations.‖ (footnote omitted)); see also
id. at 204 (―The CROWDFUND Act amends the 1933 Act to create a new Section 12(a)(2)-like cause of action against issuers who sell securities under the
crowdfunding exemption . . . . There is a possibility that funding portals may
be considered issuers for these purposes.‖ (footnote omitted)); Gregory D.
Deschler, Comment, Wisdom of the Intermediary Crowd: What the Proposed
Rules Mean for Ambitious Crowdfunding Intermediaries, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1145, 1155–62 (2014) (discussing potential funding portal liability).
226. See Mendoza, supra note 192, at 317 (―AIM created the Nomad figure
to advise small firms that lacked the experience to properly function as listed
companies.‖ (footnote omitted)).
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However, there are important limits on what a funding
portal can and should be expected to do. First, there are the
economics of funding portal viability. In short, each funding
portal will likely need to list multitudes of small startups to
make money, and therefore screening cannot be as intensive or
selective as a FundersClub or CircleUp. This is both because of
the funding portal‘s manpower time and cost and because funding portals will need to list many startups to earn fees, etc. Second, too intensive a screening process would put startups‘ fate
in funding-portal hands and negate the ability of well-informed
segments of the population (e.g., gamers, app developers) to select the winners. Therefore, it is important to allow Title III to
use funding portals as reputational intermediaries for unsophisticated investors yet also give crowd-based wisdom a
chance to work.
While the specifics can be debated, it is clear that Title III
does not make funding portals the equivalent of AIM‘s Nomads
in the most important way—by being tied in fate and fortune to
the companies they list. Title III should be amended to make
funding portals true reputational intermediaries for the
startups they list. Both theory and practice show us that reputational intermediaries can signal a company‘s quality and thus
reduce information asymmetries to a necessary level to avoid a
market for lemons.
CONCLUSION
The SEC has dual objectives of making it easier for companies to raise capital and protect investors. Often those two
goals are at odds and must be balanced.227 Crowdfunding under
the JOBS Act is such a situation,228 and President Obama and
Congress clearly put their thumb on the scale of capital formation over investor protection. That is fine under Title II,
where tried-and-true angel investor methods of reducing risk
are being successfully imported to the Internet. But Title III,
227. See Hazen, supra note 13, at 1738 (―Policymakers continually face the
challenge of effectively balancing the benefits of encouraging small business
formation against the investor protection goals of the securities laws.‖).
228. See Bradford, supra note 10, at 8 (―Crafting a crowdfunding exemption
requires a careful balancing of investor protection and capital formation.‖); see
also Langevoort, supra note 41, at 2 (―In the prevailing regulatory mindset,
encouraging entrepreneurial capital formation competes with traditional investor protection. The strong bipartisan political influence of the small business community assures that this uneasy competition will continue, with minor ebbs and flows in one direction or another.‖ (footnote omitted)).
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which enables full-blown crowdfunding, requires changes to the
concept of a funding portal, coupled with crowd-based wisdom,
to avoid becoming a market for lemons.

